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Abstract 
 
This research explores the impact of various forms of capital flows on economic 
growth and development for a group of 120 countries from 1980-2007. Traditional 
growth literature as well as the textbook theory of economic growth looks at capital flows 
as playing a vital role in fostering economic growth and development. The textbook 
theories, as well as the existing approaches to study the capital flows and economic 
development connection, use growth and development interchangeably. This analysis, 
examines the consequences of different capital flows on growth and development 
separately because the determinants of growth may not be the same as the determinants 
of development. This distinction becomes even more applicable when observing the cases 
of countries that have experienced economic growth during certain periods but were 
unable to translate the increase in economic growth to development. To investigate the 
impact of various forms of capital flows, this dissertation utilizes life expectancy in 
addition to economic growth, as a measure of development. The results from using the 
two measures show that capital flows have dissimilar impact on life expectancy as well as 
economic growth.   
The central proposition of this dissertation is that not all forms of capital flows are 
created equal. Furthermore, countries at different levels of development may differ in 
their absorptive capacity of the capital. Thus, the ability of a country to harness capital 
for development depends upon its absorptive capacity, presence of domestic resources 
ii 
and the capabilities of national governments. This study therefore not only looks at the 
role played by various forms of capital flows on growth and development, but also takes 
into account the role of political performance of national governments that can play an 
important role in maximizing the efficiency of the investments. To investigate what kinds 
of flows are beneficial at different levels of development, this analysis further divides the 
dataset into three samples of developed countries, emerging markets and less developed 
countries. The results indicate that the impact of different capital flows varies across the 
three subsamples.  
By categorizing capital flows into categories of international capital flows, 
domestic capital, and remittances, this research also finds that the type of investment, as 
well as the source of investment (foreign vs. domestic), indeed does matter. The analysis 
suggests that the key to harnessing capital for development lies with capable governments 
and efficient use of domestic resources. In absence of capable governments, influx of 
foreign capital flows can manifest itself in ways that are harmful to the progress of 
developing societies.  
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Chapter - 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Adam Smith devoted an entire volume to the timeless question of ―How do 
nations prosper and what polices ensure their wealth?‖ (Smith 1776 in Kehl 2008:4); the 
goal of this research is to revisit this age-old question in the context of the global 
economy by exploring the relative importance of the economic and political determinants 
of the wealth of nations as well as addressing how wealth can be translated into welfare 
of societies. To address this question, this dissertation looks at the impact of economic 
factors in the form of capital, both foreign and domestic, and political performance on the 
wealth as well as the welfare components of development. 
Foreign capital has been at the forefront of economic globalization. Foreign 
capital flows take the form of foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investments, 
other (loans and equity) financial investments, remittances etc. In the wake of the 
economic crisis that began in 2008, understanding these flows and their economic and 
political ramifications for host countries has become more important than ever. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated that ―the key policy challenge will be 
attracting and harnessing healthy capital flows to restore economic growth.‖ (Brogger, 
East Europe's Main Challenge is Guiding Capital Flows 2010) The Asian Development 
Bank has also advised emerging markets in Asia to manage their capital flows, as flows 
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rebound to $272.4 billion in 2010, mainly driven by the rise in portfolio equity flows. 
(Brown 2010) Although financial globalization does bring many benefits such as capital, 
knowledge and discipline (Tong and Wei 2009), the crisis of 2008 has shown that there is 
a perverse side to the influx of capital because of the reversible nature of short term 
capital.  
The discussion on the developmental impacts of the various forms of capital flows 
is very scant in the literature and empirical evidence is inconclusive. Although a growing 
body of literature has looked at the impact of financial development and growth, much 
needs to be said of the ―welfare effects of the composition of capital flows‖ (Tong and 
Wei 2009). Moreover, the studies that do look at the impact of capital flows on growth, 
consider the measures of flows that are available instead of focusing on what is relevant 
for the developmental level and political performance of a country. This paper attempts to 
fill the gap in literature by looking at how different forms of capital flows affect growth 
as well as development in developing countries.  
This study differs from existing approaches to study the capital flows and 
development connection in several fundamental ways. First, the analysis, following the 
approach of Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007), uses current account balance as a 
composite measure to address the question of whether foreign capital plays a role in 
development. However, to assess the welfare effects of various forms of flows, the 
individual effects of foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and other (short term) 
capital flows, alongside remittances and domestic savings is investigated. The role of 
politics is also formalized in this analysis by looking at the impact of the political 
performance of national governments in bringing about economic performance. Finally, 
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to address the fundamental question of whether growth translates into development, the 
impact of the economic and political variables noted above, is investigated on Life 
Expectancy at birth as a measure of development for middle to low income developing 
countries. 
The central proposition of this study is that the all forms of capital are not equal. 
The capacity to absorb foreign investments and harness it for development depends on 
the type of investment, presence of domestic resources and the capabilities of national 
governments. Countries that do not have a capable government find it hard to harness 
foreign investment for developmental objectives, but may have more success by utilizing 
domestic capital. This conjecture is confirmed by the findings of this research which 
shows that relatively less reliance on foreign capital is positively associated with growth 
as well as development in low and middle income developing countries. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 looks at the main strands of 
theoretical and empirical literature regarding the capital-development nexus. The first 
strand considers the issue of growth vs. development. The second set of literature looks at 
the capital flows and growth connection in general, as well as specific studies that 
examine the developmental impacts of various kinds of capital flows such as foreign 
direct investment, portfolio investment, remittances etc. in developing countries. The last 
strand of literature examines the politics and growth connection. Chapter 3 discusses the 
methodology that is employed in conducting this research and explains the choice of 
variables and the data sources. Chapter 4 reports the results and offers potential policy 
implications of this research and Chapter 5 concludes and addresses limitation of this 
research and offers future direction of research.  
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Chapter - 2 
Theoretical Background 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a background on the capital and 
development debate by providing formal definitions and reviewing the state of existing 
literature on the capital flows and development link. This connection raises several 
relevant questions. First, does the inflow of foreign capital bring about growth in 
developing countries or is it domestic sources of finance that are the key to bringing 
about development? Second, does economic growth occur at the expense of 
development? Third, what is the role of politics in this process? These questions have 
very important implications for the development of poor societies and have been 
extensively discussed in the fields of economics, political science, sociology, as well as 
the multidisciplinary study of sustainable development. To address these issues, it is 
important to understand the different forms of capital. What do we mean by development 
and how do we measure it; what is political performance and why it is relevant to this 
debate? The main economic and political determinants of development considered in this 
study include various forms of foreign capital flows as well as domestic sources of 
financing; a measure of political performance is used to assess the capability of national 
governments. 
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Current Account Balance 
To investigate whether foreign capital plays an important role in development by 
augmenting domestic resources, examining current account balance is a good place to 
start. The choice of current account balance as an aggregate measure on foreign capital 
inflows is motivated by Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian 2007. Current account balance 
―is equivalent to a country‘s saving less its investment, provides a summary measure of 
the net amount of capital, including private and official capital, flowing in or out of a 
country.‖ (Prasad et al. 2007: 154) According to this definition, current account surplus 
corresponds to the net amount of capital leaving the country, or, in other words, an excess 
of domestic savings over domestic investment. Similarly, current account deficit shows 
the opposite picture, i.e. excess of domestic investment over domestic savings, which 
indicates that foreign financing is picking up the difference. Figure 1 shows the global 
trends in current account surplus and current account deficits from 1975 through 2005.  
 
Figure 1: Relative GDP per Capita of Capital Exporters and Capital Importers: 1975-
2005 
 
Source: (Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian 2007: 155)  
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The problem however, with only using current account balance as the exclusive 
measure to study the impact of capital flows on growth as done by Prasad et al. (2007) is 
that it is a homogenous measure and does not tell us anything about the welfare 
compositions of various forms of capital flows. Additionally, in the time period 1980-
2007, considered for this research, developing countries included in the sample have 
undergone some dramatic changes in their composition of various forms of capital 
flows
1
, therefore it is important to consider the impact of various flows on development, 
separately. Although current account balance gives an idea of whether countries are net 
exporters of capital or net importers of capital, it is also important to look at the channels 
through which domestic investment is financed. 
 
Domestic Savings 
Domestic savings here are defined as gross national savings less the value of 
consumption of fixed capital. (World Bank 2010) According to traditional text book 
model, there are two methods of financing domestic investments, foreign savings, and 
domestic savings. It has been argued that domestic savings provide the most sustainable 
form of investment in most countries (Prasad et al. 2007). 
Studying the impact of domestic savings on growth and development in this 
model allows us to test the traditional view that ―foreign capital permits capital-
constrained poor countries to expand domestic investment and thereby increase growth.‖ 
(Prasad et al. 2007) If this is indeed true, the relationship between domestic savings and 
                                                 
1
 While the beginning of 1980 was marked by high bank debt, in the aftermath of the debt crisis the role of 
banks diminished as major players in the early1990s. Instead, the 1990s saw an increase in private 
investments which coincided with the fall of communism and opening up of the transition economies of 
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growth should be negative or insignificant hence encouraging the need for foreign 
sources of financing. Figure 2 below plots savings (S curve) and investment (I curve) 
against real interest in two scenarios. When the economy is closed to foreign capital, 
equilibrium is at point B with rdom as the interest rate; however once the economy is 
opened to foreign capital, increase in capital flows brings the new equilibrium at point C 
and lowers the interest rate to r
*
.  Decrease in interest rate according to this textbook 
model leads to higher investment which leads to higher growth.
2
 
 
Figure 2: Savings, Investment and Economic Growth in the Textbook Model 
  
Source: Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian 2007:167 
 
                                                 
2
 This discussion draws upon the analysis of Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) and the choice of 
domestic savings as a measure of domestic resources is also motivated by their analysis.  
8 
The following figures (Figure 3 and Figure 4) compare geographic dispersion of 
worldwide savings in 1981-1985 and 2006-2010. The figures below represent how the 
attitudes in savings worldwide have shifted dramatically during the time period 
considered in this analysis. 
 
Figure 3: Adjusted Savings in 1981-1985 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development indicators 2010: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
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Figure 4: Adjusted Savings in 2006-2010 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development indicators 2010: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
 
As can be seen from the map, savings in the developing world increased 
dramatically from the 1980s levels in Latin America and East Asia in 2006-2010. United 
States and Japan dominate the map in terms of savings in Figure 3, show a decline in 
Figure 4, followed by a dramatic increase in China‘s savings. However, not all countries 
in the developing world have experienced high savings for several reasons such as low 
interest rates and lack of domestic investment opportunities. Kamewe-Tsafack (2010) 
notes that while Latin America and East Asia showed average gross savings rates as high 
as 22% and 35% respectively, the savings rate in Sub-Saharan Africa has been a modest 
16%, ―with some countries displaying modest domestic savings rates (for example 
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Guinea 3%, Burundi 4%, Mozambique and Ghana 7%) to relatively robust savings rates 
(for example Lesotho 22%, Rwanda 27%, and Mali 28%).‖ (Kamewe-Tsafack 2010:1) 
There are many reasons why domestic savings can be expected to positively 
influence growth and economic stability. A high saving rate may make an economy less 
vulnerable to macroeconomic instability and external shocks that reverse other forms of 
capital flows. Furthermore, while  
investment can be financed with either internal or foreign resources, the empirical 
evidence shows that when  external borrowings exceed a certain threshold, even 
highly  successful economies begin to have trouble to service their foreign debt. 
(Calafell 2003) 
For this analysis, the inclusion of domestic savings allows us to address whether growth 
financed by domestic resources reduces external vulnerability by reducing dependence on 
foreign capital as well as aid. In addition to the earlier noted composite measure of capital 
and domestic savings, the following forms of foreign investment are considered in this 
analysis. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
According to the IMF‘s Balance of Payments Manual, 5th edition, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) ―reflecting the lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy 
(direct investor) in an entity resident in another economy (direct investment enterprise)—
covers all transactions between direct investors and direct investment enterprises.‖3 The 
literature in economics has particularly focused on the role of FDI as the engine of 
                                                 
3
 For the purpose of this analysis, FDI flows instead of FDI stock are considered. The reason for using 
flows instead of stocks is that a change in stock can result from a number of factors including changes in 
flows, changes in exchange rates or other adjustments etc., flows on the other hand reflect only transactions 
are more relevant from a policy perspective.  
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economic growth. Various empirical studies argue that FDI has a positive impact on 
growth by augmenting resources as well as transferring technology. However, some 
make the case that the effect of FDI on development depends on the sector as well as the 
motivations, i.e. whether FDI is resource-seeking or market-seeking (Cohen 2007; Moran 
2005). For instance, Moran (2005) looks at two categories of FDI viz., manufacturing and 
assembly, and natural resources and infrastructure. His findings demonstrate that 
depending on the sector as well as the condition in the host country, FDI can offer great 
benefits and yet at the same time, under a different set of conditions, FDI may be very 
detrimental for the development of poor countries. Looking at disaggregated FDI by 
sector is outside the scope of this project but does provide direction for future research.  
A majority of literature does consider FDI a relatively more stable form of capital 
flows. As a result a large number of empirical studies on capital flows and growth focus 
primarily on FDI. According to the World Bank report on Global Development Finance 
(2006), ―FDI tends to be more stable than debt, in the sense that current FDI is strongly 
correlated to its past levels.‖ (2006:143) This assertion has been put to test by the recent 
downturn and the consequent reduction in all forms of capital flows, including FDI. 
Nevertheless, the last decade has seen a predominant shift in the composition of capital 
towards FDI. This trend has been especially true for the countries that were adversely 
affected by the East Asian currency crisis in 1997. Figure 5 below shows trends in FDI 
and projections for the future. According to the figure, despite a drastic decline in FDI 
during the recession, FDI flows are recovering. This recovery is primarily led by 
developing and transition economies which absorbed half of world FDI flows in 2009.  
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Figure 5: Global FDI Flows 2002-2009 and projections for 2010-2012 
 
Source:  UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010:2 
 
Furthermore, even though half of the world‘s FDI goes to developing countries, in 
2009 only 0.4% of the world FDI went to structurally weak and vulnerable economies 
comprised of least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries 
(LLDCs) and Small Island developing states (SIDS).(UNCTAD 2010). The following 
table shows a composition of global FDI flows by region. 
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Table 1: FDI Flows by Region 2007-2009 
  
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010:6 
 
UNCTAD estimated FDI flows in 2010 to be $1.2 trillion, before picking up to 
$1.3–1.5 trillion in 2011. Despite these trends, the evidence on the universal effects of 
FDI remains inconclusive. The pursuit of universal impact of FDI is further complicated 
by the large regional variation in FDI flows as depicted in figure 6. In addition, all efforts 
to date look at the impact of FDI on growth in GDP per Capita and no study to date has 
14 
looked at whether benefits from FDI if any translate into development measured 
differently from growth in GDP per Capita. 
 
Figure 6: Geographic Distribution of FDI to EMCs 
 
Source: UNCTAD 1990-2002, Balance of Payments Statistical Yearbook: 44  
 
Foreign Portfolio Investments 
According to the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, 5th edition, Foreign Portfolio 
Investment (FPI) is defined as ―cross-border transactions and positions involving debt or 
equity securities, other than those included in direct investment or reserve assets.‖ Some 
have argued that portfolio flows can also play an important role in developing domestic 
markets which in turn has a positive impact on growth (Gruben and McLeod (1998); 
Kyaw and Macdonald 2009). According to Vita and Kyaw (2009) ―Portfolio investment 
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flows can bolster economic growth by increasing the liquidity of domestic capital 
markets and by inducing greater market efficiency. As domestic markets become more 
liquid, deeper and broader, a wider range of projects can be financed, further stimulating 
growth and development.‖ (2009: 277) However this theorized relationship between 
portfolio flows and growth has received much less attention in the empirical literature. 
 
Other Financial Investments 
The Other Financial Investment (OFI) category ―is a residual category that 
includes positions and transactions other than those included in direct investment, 
portfolio investment, financial derivatives and employee stock options, and reserve 
assets‖ (IMF Balance of Payments Manual, 6th edition). This category includes trade 
credits, loans, currency, and deposits. Because data on these capital-flows are not readily 
available, especially for the low income developing countries, the impact of these flows 
has not been studied extensively in the literature.  
Although FPI and OFI are considered by some to play an important role in 
growth, by impacting the financial development of host country‘s financial markets, their 
role is not extensively documented in the literature, with a few notable exceptions. 
Gruben and McLeod (1998) look at the impact of portfolio flows on growth for a small 
group of developing countries and find portfolio flows to be growth inducing. Others 
such as Mishra, Mody and Murshi (2001) find that portfolio flows develop domestic 
capital markets, which in turn affects growth. Iyer, Rambaldi, and Tang (2004) look at 
the spillover effects of various forms of capital flows such as FDI, FPI and OFI in 20 
OECD countries. Their findings suggest that the spillover effects of FDI flows are greater 
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than FPI and OFI and therefore ―FDI flows are more growth inducing than alternative 
forms of foreign investment.‖ (2004: 21) A drawback of their work is that it primarily 
focuses on a small number of OECD countries, and based on Blonigen and Wang (2005) 
and Egger and Winner (2006), OECD country findings are not generalizable to non-
OECD countries.  
 
Worker’s Remittances 
IMF's Balance of Payments Manual 6
th
 edition, defines remittances as ―current 
private transfers from migrant workers resident in the host country for more than a year, 
irrespective of their immigration status, to recipients in their country of origin.‖ 
Remittances are one of the largest sources of external financing in many low-income 
countries. (World Bank 2006) They are also a relatively more stable form of funding than 
FDI, FPI and OFI (Buch and Kuckulenz 2004; Ratha 2003; World Bank, Challenges in 
Managing Capital Flows 2006)]. Despite their growing importance, very little empirical 
work exists on the impact of remittances on growth. Ratha (2003) makes the case that 
remittances are a very important source of development finance and observes that in 
countries with sound economic policies these remittances are often invested by the 
recipients. Another important feature of remittances is their countercyclical nature  
remittances are less volatile and fairly stable during economic downturns as compared to 
other forms of capital flows, including FDI (Ratha 2003; World Bank, Challenges in 
Managing Capital Flows 2006). In the recent economic downturn, remittances declined 
by 7.3%, according to a recent report by the World Bank, this decrease have been far 
smaller as compared to the decline in other forms of private capital flows. (Migration and 
17 
Development Brief 2008). Furthermore, in South Asia remittance flows have been 
especially resilient and continued to grow in 2009. Figure 7 shows the dramatic rise in 
remittances in LDCs in the last three decades. 
 
Figure 7: Remittances in LDCs (Current US dollars) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development indicators 2010: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
 
This important source of development finance in poor countries, remittances have 
not received enough attention in the literature on financial globalization, which has 
mainly focused on FDI, FPI and loans. The nature of remittances is that of direct transfers 
and therefore expected to have a direct impact on the human welfare component of 
development. The current empirical literature on remittances, usually microeconomic 
analysis, draws on survey data of ―migrant-worker and household behavior.‖ (Buch, 
Kuckulenz and Manchec 2002: 9) 
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Buch et al (2002) make the case that, if invested, remittances may have a positive 
impact on both the quality and quantity of investment. ―Since migrants have a better 
understanding of local conditions than foreign creditors, remittances may help overcome 
asymmetric information and enforcement problems that typically beleaguer international 
capital markets.‖ (2002: 8) Thus, the current study considers how well remittances fare in 
comparison to other forms of investments in poor countries, this aspect of the study is 
very important because there is a lack of empirical literature on the impact of remittances 
on the overall economic development.  
 
Official Development Assistance 
Foreign aid flows also known as Official Development Assistance (ODA) are an 
important source of external finance for most LDCs. Although ODA flows are not driven 
by market forces in contrast to the other forms of capital considered in this research, they 
are included in the LDC sample because of their relevance to less developed countries 
that are highly aid-dependent. Looking at ODA flows becomes even more important 
when investigating the causes of growth without development that is observed in several 
poor countries.  
Despite being extensively explored in literature, there is a lack of robust findings 
on the universal effects of aid on economic development. Studies have reported findings 
all across the spectrum from a positive impact of aid on growth and development, to aid 
being detrimental to growth creating a destabilizing impact to institutions. Some have 
argued that ―aid might be particularly associated with weak governance, possibly because 
19 
aid inflows reduce the need for governments to tax the governed or enlist their 
cooperation.‖ (Rajan and Subramanian 2007: 9) Similarly, a large number of studies have 
tried to investigate the aid and growth connection; however, there is no unanimous 
agreement in literature on the impact of aid on growth and very little research addresses 
the issue of whether aid flows improve human development. 
 
Political Performance 
The conceptualization of political performance of this study is based on Arbetman 
and Kugler (1997) and Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Kugler, Abdollahian, Kang, Tammen 
(forthcoming: chapter 1) who argue that ―an effective government will achieve desired 
policy outcomes; a weak one will not. Political performance emulates in the political and 
institutional arena what GDP approximates in the economic field. Just as a rising 
GDP/per capita indicates financial success, political performance reflects policy success.‖ 
They offer a three pronged approach to calculating political performance based on a 
government‘s ability to extract resources, mobilize its population and allocate resources 
to meet its objectives. The three components of political performance according to this 
approach are Relative Political Extraction (RPE), Relative Political Reach (RPR) and 
Relative Political Performance (RPA). RPE as a component of political performance 
measures a government‘s capacity to extract resources from the population and 
implement a given set of policies (Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. forthcoming). RPR 
approximates the ability of the government to mobilize its population based on the labor 
participation in the formal sector of the economy. Finally, RPA measures the gap 
between actual expenditure and the optimal expenditures necessary for development. 
20 
These measures of political performance are independent of regime type and offer a 
comparison of capabilities across nations at various points in time. The measures for RPE 
and RPR have been developed, while work on RPA is still in its infancy. Out of these 
three measures of political performance, RPE measures have been the most widely tested 
and have shown consistent results.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, only the political extraction component is 
used as an indirect measure of political performance. There are several reasons for this, 
first, the empirical validity of the relationship between political extraction and political 
performance have been demonstrated in earlier works of Kugler and Organski (1980) and 
Arbetman and Kugler (1997).
4
 Secondly, the data for RPE has been tested and has 
produced reliable results. And finally, not much is known of the interactive effect 
between RPE, RPR and RPA. RPE offers a plausible assessment of political performance 
because policy implementation requires resources; efficient governments are expected to 
effectively extract resources to meet their policy goals where inefficient governments fail 
to do so. According to Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. (forthcoming) ―how much tax 
revenues a government can extract is a function of the level of economic development as 
well as the economic profile of the country‖ (forthcoming:14). Figure 5 incorporated 
from (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson forthcoming) depicts the political performance 
of governments at different levels of development and shows that efficient governments 
are better equipped to enact policy choices that impact economic and human 
development.  This measure of political performance is a departure from the existing 
                                                 
4
 Early attempts in the literature to use taxing power of governments as a measure of capability are seen in 
Musgrave‘s (1983) work on ―Who should Tax, Where and What?‖ as well as the work of Lotz and Morse 
(1967), Bahl (1971) and Organski and Kugler (1980). 
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approaches in literature to measure the capabilities of national governments. Existing 
attempts to measure government performance are based either on democracy research or 
on quality of governance rather than a focus on a government‘s effectiveness in 
implementing policy goals.  
 
Figure 8: Political Performance and Development 
 
Source: Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson forthcoming: chapter 3 
 
In addition to relative political extraction as a measure of government 
performance, this dissertation also considered alternative measures prevalent in the 
literature on the political/institutional determinants of development. Two widely used 
sources are considered, viz. Heritage Foundation data on economic freedom and World 
Bank‘s World Governance Indicators. The merits of each are evaluated individually.  
Heritage foundation provides an index of economic freedom in which they define 
economic freedom as ―an absolute right of property ownership; fully realized freedoms of 
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movement for labor, capital, and goods; and an absolute absence of coercion or constraint 
of economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain 
liberty itself.‖ To this end, the heritage foundation data presents ten5 specific economic 
freedoms on a scale of 0 to 100 and the average of these ten freedoms form their measure 
of economic freedom. There are several limitations of these measures. First, as pointed 
out by Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. (forthcoming), these measures of freedom reflect the 
policy choices of governments rather than capturing the ability of governments to make 
and implement choices. Secondly, these measures are strongly related to each other 
therefore their aggregation does not provide a unique understanding of the concept they 
aim to measure. And finally, as argued by Sala-i-Martin (1994), policy choices are so 
closely correlated with each other that data cannot tell them apart. For instance, 
―countries with high inflation rates tend to have distorted trade regimes and repressed 
financial sectors. They are also countries that are politically and socially unstable. None 
of the variables is a perfect measure of the phenomenon that matters; a government in 
disarray affects the nation‘s growth performance adversely.‖ (Sala-i-Martin 1994) Thus 
none of these indicators actually measure the political performance and in fact are an 
imperfect measure of the same phenomenon.  
The World Bank‘s Governance Indicators (WGI) corresponds to six major aspects 
of governance. Governance in this context is defined as traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised (World Bank). The first measure in this regard 
is Voice and Accountability which gives the process by which the government is selected 
                                                 
5
 The ten components of economic freedom measured by Heritage Foundation are Business Freedom, 
Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, 
Financial Freedom, Property Rights, Freedom from Corruption and Labor Freedom 
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and replaced and the participation of the citizens in the process. The next measure, 
Political Stability gives the likelihood of the government staying in power. Changes in 
government and its policies influence the quality of governance. Government 
Effectiveness is a measure of bureaucratic quality, competence of the officials and the 
independence of their dealings from political pressure. Regulatory Quality looks at the 
nature of the policies by examining the incidence of market-unfriendly polices in areas 
such as foreign trade and business development (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Labato´n 
2002). Rule of Law gives the extent to which people abide by the rules of the society and 
the fairness of these rules in regards to the sound working of the economic and social 
environment of the country. The last measure, Control of Corruption measures the 
perceptions of corruption in the country. The WGI have also attracted similar criticism as 
the Heritage Foundation measures; Langbein and Knack (2010) perform an empirical 
analysis of the WGI and conclude that these indicators are indeed reliable measures, but 
the phenomenon they measure is not entirely clear. These measures are further related to 
GDP per capita and not entirely distinct from each other which makes their validity as 
adequate measures of unique aspects of political performance problematic. 
 
Does Growth Mean Development? 
The element of interest in this study is to determine what brings about welfare in 
societies. The discipline of economics has tried to solve the problem of welfare of nations 
by the ubiquitous measure of growth in GDP per capita. Due to its simplicity, its wide 
acceptance as a reasonable measure of various dimensions of human welfare, as well as 
absence of a better alternative that proxy‘s human development, GDP per capita has been 
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used as the standard measure of national development (Kelley 1991). Despite being 
widely used and accepted as a measure of development, GDP per capita has serious 
limitations because it fails to incorporate important dimensions of welfare such as health, 
education, etc. According to Acemoglu (2009), income differences between countries do 
have welfare consequences, however it does not imply that GDP per capita is a 
―sufficient statistic for the welfare of the average citizen‖ (2009: 8). It also ignores 
several other dimensions of development such as provision of certain kinds of freedoms 
to the society such as political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, 
transparency, and security (Sen 2001). 
Efforts have been made to propose alternative measures of development, the most 
notable of which is Human Development Index (HDI) offered by United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) in its Human Development Report (HDR). HDI is a 
composite of life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and real GDP per capita. Figure 4 
below shows a ranking of countries by the HDI index and GDP per Capita. It is clear 
from Figure 10 below that there is a large disparity between the two measures. However, 
according to Kelley (1991), when HDI is compared to the log of GDP per Capita as 
shown in Figure 5, the observed disparity in Figure 4 vanishes and in fact GDP per 
Capita appears to provide a reasonable approximation for HDI (1991: 322). Thus, 
according to Kelley (1991) once the log transformation of GDP per capita is made, HDI 
makes very modest contribution in providing a new approach to development. 
In addition to it being closely linked to GDP per capita, another limitation of HDI 
is that it is only available in five-year intervals; because of the nature of the data, it is 
illogical to extrapolate. 
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Figure 9: Ranking of Countries by HDI and GDP per Capita 
  
Figure 10: Ranking of Countries by HDI and log GDP per Capita
Source: A. C. Kelley 1991:321-323 
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This study proposes to use Life Expectancy at birth as a better approximation of 
human development. Life Expectancy at birth indicates ―the number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth were to stay the 
same throughout its life.‖ (World Bank 2010: http://data.worldbank.org/) Several 
important reasons motivate the use of life expectancy as a measure of development. First, 
Life Expectancy at birth forms the health component in the calculation of HDI; second, it 
provides an empirically practical way to measure development that is different from GDP 
per capita. Life Expectancy as a measure of development is also found in the work of 
Lutz (1995), who argues that it is a fundamental measure of social development because 
it reflects the distributional effects of wealth. Using the Life Expectancy based measures 
developed by Lutz (1995), other have argued that ―inequalities are expressed not only in 
terms of income but also in terms of the allocation of social services, being poor leads to 
a shorter life because the individual is not able to meet the basic needs of food, health, 
and shelter.‖ Along the same lines, Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (forthcoming) 
argue that measures that reflect the extent to which the needs of a population are being 
met are a better proxy for the quality of life of the population over wealth based 
assessments of poverty.  
The following section reviews the neo-classical theory of economic growth as 
well as the state of existing empirical literature on the capital flows, politics, and 
development connection.  
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Theories of Economic Growth: Solow Model 
One of the most influential works in neoclassical economic growth theory is the 
growth model developed by Robert Solow (1956). A very important implication of the 
Solow Model is the ―convergence hypothesis,‖ i.e. economies ultimately converge to 
their steady state income levels. This implies that countries at low levels of development 
should have higher growth rates than countries at higher levels of development because 
they are further away from their steady state. The Solow Model contested the findings of 
the Harrod-Domar Model and instead proposed a model where the capital-output ratio 
would bring an economy back on its path to steady state growth. 
As data started to become available in 1980s and 1990s, there was resurgence in 
literature on economic growth which could now benefit from empirically studying what 
neoclassical literature of the 1960s had theorized. The empirical literature utilized cross-
section analysis, time-series data and case studies and more recently panel data methods.  
Early empirical literature failed to find evidence on convergence and led theorists to 
question the neo-classical model. However, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil (1992) argued that neoclassical model did not predict that poor 
countries would grow faster but rather predicted that ―the growth rate of an economy was 
inversely related to the distance from its steady state.‖ (Sala-i-Martin 1994) Only if all 
economies converged to the same steady state, despite their differences is technologies, 
savings, taxation etc., would poor countries grow faster. This concept of convergence 
conditional on the steady state is termed ―conditional convergence.‖ Later studies by 
Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) etc. maintaining the basic framework of 
Solow Model added some explanatory variables which formed the baseline for much of 
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the empirical work in growth economics. Because of Barro‘s extensive use of cross-
country growth regressions to study growth determinants, cross-country regressions are 
also referred to as ―Barro Regressions.‖ (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple 2004) The next 
section discusses the state of the existing empirical literature on the determinants growth 
and development.  
 
Limitations of the Existing Research on Capital Flows, Politics and Development 
Existing empirical literature in the capital flows and development connection is 
deficient and inconclusive in fundamental ways. A large number of studies that explore 
the impact of capital flows on development either use aggregate measures for capital 
flows or are mainly focused on the FDI and growth connection. (Kyaw and MacDonald 
2009) The studies that aim to explore the developmental impact of FDI do not have 
conclusive results. None of these address whether or not the capital flows prompted 
growth in GDP per capita translates into human development.  
Neo-classical theorists have long argued that influx of foreign capital have very 
important developmental implications for capital starved poor countries. According to the 
neoclassical growth models, such as the Solow Model noted above, poor countries that 
are scarce in capital would have a higher marginal productivity of capital implying higher 
returns on investments. These theories have assumed that capital would therefore flow 
from rich developed countries to poor developing countries and therefore bring about the 
economic transformation of weak economies that would not otherwise be possible. 
(deSoysa 2003) 
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Empirical studies on the capital flows and economic growth connection show 
mixed results; the impact of capital flows on development (measured differently from 
growth) remains almost entirely undocumented. Some have argued that these ambiguous 
results are due to inaccurate pooling of developed and developing countries in the same 
sample (Blonigen and Wang 2005) while others argue that the mixed results are due to 
aggregating capital flows and failure to break up capital flows into various categories by 
income. (Kyaw and MacDonald 2009)  
Traditional neoclassical economics literature has looked at growth of GDP per 
capita as a proxy for the rate of development. However, as noted above, ―strategies solely 
to boost overall growth may miss opportunities to reduce poverty more effectively.‖ 
(World Bank Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2006) The question of 
whether increase in growth brings about development is one that is becoming 
exceedingly important to answer, especially as the critics of globalization continue to 
point out that ―globalization might be creating rich countries with poor people.‖ (Stiglitz 
2006: 9). Very little empirical work exists on the developmental impacts of other forms 
of capital flows such as portfolio flows, bank lending, remittances etc. And finally, the 
role of politics is primarily left out in the literature on the link between capital flows and 
development.  Some notable empirical studies in the economics literature are as follows.  
 
Empirical Approaches to Capital Flows Development 
Prasad et al. (2007) empirically explore the question of whether foreign capital 
plays a ―helpful, benign, or malign role in economic growth.‖ (2007: 153)Their study 
uses current account balance as a composite measure of capital flows, because from a 
30 
financing perspective, they argue, all forms of capital are relevant for determining the 
impact on growth (2007: 157-158). According to the authors, ―financial 
underdevelopment and underdevelopment more generally, could exacerbate foreign 
capital‘s contribution to a rise in costs in the non-traded sector, and to overvaluation.‖ 
Prasad et al. (2007) Their findings suggest that poor countries have little ability to absorb 
the financial capital, and in some cases rapid inflow of capital may lead to the 
overvaluation of the domestic currency. Other detrimental aspects of foreign capital can 
include increasing economic volatility because of the reversible nature of some capital 
flows. One problem with the analysis of Prasad et al. (2007) is their treatment of capital 
flows as a single aggregate measure rather than examining the impact of various capital 
flows separately. 
Many studies have argued that the composition of capital flows indeed matters 
when evaluating the impact on growth as well as the issue of currency crisis (Eichengreen 
2004; Henry 2006; World Bank 2006; Tong and Wei 2009). A detailed analysis on the 
issue of capital flows and crisis is found in the work of Eichengreen (2004), who argues 
that although foreign finance can contribute positively by augmenting domestic resources 
and transferring technology, the ―magnitude of these benefits is disputed, and none of 
them is guaranteed, especially if capital movements set the stage for costly crisis‖ (2004: 
4). Although the current study does not directly explore the issue of currency crisis, it 
motivates the consideration of multiple sources of capital when exploring the growth and 
finance connection. 
Tong and Wei (2009) examine the link between foreign capital and crisis by 
exploring whether ―the pre-crisis volume and composition of capital inflows 
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systematically affect the severity of the credit crunch across countries.‖ (2009: 4) Their 
analysis on the 2007-2009 crisis shows that it has a direct correlation to the severity of 
the impact that a credit crunch creates. Their findings suggest that although the volume of 
pre-crisis capital flows is not systematically related to the severity of the credit-crunch, 
the composition of the flows definitely matters. They find that large pre-crisis exposure to 
non-FDI flows is related to the severity of the credit-crunch. This lends support to the 
argument that ―different types of capital flows bring different benefits and costs to 
recipient countries.‖ (2009: 5) This also serves as a rationalization for the current study to 
use different types of capital flows in determining the welfare effect of flows, if any, on 
the host countries.  
There is a growing body of empirical literature in economics discussing the 
impact of FDI on growth; however the literature is not developed on the theoretical front. 
The most notable contributions to the relevant literature are summarized below.  
Moran, Graham and Blomström (2005) conduct an analysis to answer to the 
question, ―How does FDI impact economic development?‖ Their study specifically 
investigates whether it is a good policy for developing countries to allocate scarce 
resources to create conditions that would attract FDI. They point to the importance of 
positive externalities and spillovers as an important issue in answering this question. 
Consequently, they offer new approaches to measure the positive spillovers from 
multinational activity, which are very difficult to quantify but nevertheless very essential 
for the host countries. Görg and Strobl (2005) however argue that the traditional 
characterization of spillovers is too restrictive and therefore provide a methodology that 
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evaluates spillovers that result in improved profitability of the domestic firms within host 
countries. 
Lipsey and Sjöholm (2005) analyzed why past studies have come to such varying 
conclusions on the impact of FDI on domestic economies. They analyzed a series of 
causes starting from differences in techniques, and difficulties in quantifying spillovers; 
they attribute the variance in results to the differences in abilities of the countries to 
benefit from FDI. These differences according to their analysis are a result of factors such 
as policies, levels of domestic competition, private-sector sophistication etc. Thus, they 
conclude, that a quest for universal effects of FDI on development is futile as the results 
vary based on host country attributes. This also indicates the importance of using a 
variable of political performance in the current study and expanding the analysis to a 
broad range of capital flows to determine what type of flows are best suited given the 
capacity of institutions. 
In another study, using data collected from Indonesia, Blalock and Gertler (2005) 
find that presence of externalities result in economic returns to host countries which 
exceed the private returns to multinational investors. The reason for this finding 
according to the authors is due to technology transfers, which lead to ―lower prices, 
increased output, higher profitability and increased entry in the supplier market.‖ 
(2005:73) A big factor in technology transfers, based on evidence from a series of 
interviews carried out in Indonesia, is the stringent requirements of the United States and 
Japanese firms regarding quality control, design control and inventory control. Meeting 
these standards requires educating the local managers in the multinational corporation‘s 
quality assurance procedures.  
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Asim Erdilek (2005) compares the R&D (research and development) activities of 
multinationals versus the domestic firms using evidence from Turkey. His findings show 
that foreign firms with high levels of external ownership and lower propensity to engage 
in R&D as compared to foreign firms with low levels of external ownership. This finding 
is contrary to the view that multinationals are more likely to share technologies with their 
wholly or majority owned subsidiaries as compared to less controlled companies. 
Carkovic and Levine (2005) investigate the relationship between FDI and growth 
and conclude that FDI does not accelerate growth as a general proposition. However 
factors that do contribute to growth, as well as FDI, according to this analysis, are the 
sound economic policies of the host country. Blonigen and Wang (2005) disagree with 
this finding. They bring up a point, usually unnoticed in cross-country empirical analysis 
involving FDI. A method that pools developed countries and developing countries 
together is based on the false premise that the impact of FDI is similar for developed and 
developing countries. The data shows that in reality it is the opposite. According to 
Blonigen and Wang (2005), the results change quite a bit when data of the rich and poor 
countries is pooled separately. A main reason for the difference in results is that countries 
at different levels of development differ in their absorptive capacity of capital. Some have 
argued that this difference in absorptive capacity can hinder the growth-inducing impact 
of capital flows (Lucas 1990). As a result, estimation that pools all the countries together 
is a faulty method and leads to misleading conclusions. Similarly, it is also misleading to 
pool emerging market countries that have had high economic growth rates with low-
income non-industrial non-transition countries. This argument necessitates splitting the 
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data into categories of Developed Countries, Emerging Markets, and Less Developed 
Countries in this dissertation.  
Egger and Winner (2006) also find a difference in FDI flows to OECD economies 
as compared to non-OECD economies; lending further validity to the Blonigen and Wang 
(2005) argument. In addition, Akcay (2001) in his study on developing economies finds 
that country characteristics such as education level, infrastructure etc. play an important 
role in determining the net impact of FDI flows.  
Globerman and Shapiro (2002), specifically look at the government infrastructure 
of a country in terms of political, economic, and legal institutions that makes it a recipient 
of United States FDI. Their findings suggest that improvement of government 
infrastructure increases the country‘s probability of receiving greater FDI flows 
highlighting the importance of political reform in order to stimulate economic growth in 
LDCs. Various other factors in the literature linked to attracting FDI are transaction 
freedom, market size, exchange rate regimes, a legal system that follows English 
Common Law and a legislation that effectively protects property rights (Globerman and 
Shapiro 2002; Kaufmann et al. 2002). 
 
Political Economy Approaches to Capital Flows and Development 
While a substantial amount of empirical literature supports the claim that foreign 
capital promotes development, a comparable amount of literature demonstrates a negative 
relationship between foreign capital and development (Kehl 2008). An influential body of 
literature in Sociology and Political Science sees the structural power of international 
capital as exploitive and harmful to developing countries (deSoysa 2003) . Dependency 
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theorists have argued that the foreign investment from the Multinational Corporations 
(MNC) in core countries to the developing nations is harmful to their long term economic 
growth. In this tradition the work of Bornschier (1980), Dos Santos (1970); and 
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) is notable. Bornschier‘s (1980) empirical analysis 
finds that ―MNC-penetration is negatively related to subsequent investment growth‖; the 
author uses this finding to lend credence to the ―decapitalization thesis‖ which argues that 
MNCs have long- term negative effect on income growth. Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 
(1985) support this finding by arguing that MNC penetration systematically under-
develops host countries economically, socially, and politically. According to this view, 
FDI may cause an initial increase in growth, however, ―peripheral countries that adopt 
this path of unequal development based on income equality and foreign capital imports 
will experience economic stagnation.‖ (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985:39)  The 
results of this influential study in the dependency tradition were later disputed by 
Firebaugh (1992), whose reanalysis showed a methodological flaw in the analysis of 
Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985). (deSoysa 2003) 
Other dependency theorists such as Dos Santos (1970) view underdevelopment as 
a consequence of the world expansion of capitalism, and focus on a new postwar form of 
dependence called ―technological-industrial dependence‖ instigated by multinational 
corporations. This form of dependence places structural limits on the development of the 
third world economies by creating deficits. Dos Santos (1970) argues that, ―foreign 
capital retains control over the most dynamic sectors of the economy and repatriates a 
high volume of profit; consequently capital accounts are highly unfavorable to dependent 
countries.‖ (1970:233) As a result, the dependent economies get trapped in a vicious 
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circle where they become dependent on the foreign sources of finance to fill the holes 
that were created by foreign capital in the first place (DosSantos 1970).  
The claims of dependency theory were contested by scholars such as Hein (1992). 
Instead the focus turned to the important role of state and policies in the process of 
development. Hein‘s (1992) analysis did not find support for the dependency theory and 
instead found growth to be dependent on factors such as region, policy, population and 
the political stability. Furthermore, Hein‘s (1992) findings show that state policies affect 
economic growth as seen in the case of Asia and Latin America, where official economic 
policies were relevant factors in the explanation of foreign investment and economic 
growth connection. Hein (1992) argues that ―the dependency approach to development 
may be applicable to specific regions of the world at certain historical periods, but its 
ability to generalize to other cases is limited.‖ (Hein 1992:496) Later dependency 
theorists such as Dixon and Boswell (1996) made the case that domestic investments are 
more growth-inducing than FDI. This further encourages the inclusion of domestic 
sources of capital in the current study. Others dependency scholars such as Kay and 
Gwynne (2000) linked the financial vulnerability to dependency, specifically in the 
context of the financial crisis in Latin America and East Asia. 
Kehl (2008) argues that one of the reasons for such contradictory themes in 
regards to the role of international capital development is due to the central problem that 
―foreign investors and domestic host governments have divergent interests: foreign 
investors are interested in maximizing profits,  governments of host countries are, 
presumably, interested in promoting domestic growth‖ (Kehl 2008). Primarily focusing 
on FDI as a measure of foreign capital, Kehl (2008) makes the case that the benefits of 
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foreign investment on domestic development are in fact contingent on the interaction of 
―foreign investment with democratic institutions and government effectiveness‖. Thus, 
according to this analyst, prior research focuses on how to attract foreign investment 
rather than how to utilize it and she argues that ―democratic development and effective 
policy-making institutions can increase the capacity of governments to utilize foreign 
investment to promote domestic economic growth.‖ A major drawback of this research is 
that it primarily focuses on FDI, thus ignoring the relative importance of other forms of 
capital, including domestic resources. Furthermore, for analyzing the role of politics, 
Kehl (2008)  uses measures of democracy from Polity IV dataset; and for government 
effectiveness she uses the widely criticized world governance indicators. The next section 
further explores the notable attempts to explore the political determinants of 
development. 
 
Politics and Development  
Most attempts to look at the role of politics in the process of development are 
based on democracy research. Much of this research on the democracy and financial 
globalization connection, however, has ambiguous results. Eichengreen and Leblang 
(2006) support the idea that, ―there are causal connections between globalization and 
democracy is intuitively appealing.‖ (2006:6). Various studies have reported findings 
such as democracies remove capital controls and thus contribute to financial openness. 
(Brune and Guisinger 2003; Quinn 2000) Others find similar positive relationship 
between democracy and trade openness (Lopez-Cordova and Meissner 2005; Yu 2005) 
However, the approaches employed by these studies have been criticized on 
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methodological grounds. (Barro 1998; Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) Similarly, many 
studies have explored the connection between democracy and development, yet the 
evidence has been inconclusive. This study further formalizes the role of politics in the 
process of development by using a measures of political performance based on the work 
of Arbetman and Kugler (1997) and Arbetman et al. (forthcoming). 
Barro (1996) in a widely quoted empirical study makes the case that studies 
which show a positive relationship between democracy and growth, do so only because 
they do not account for human capital. He argues that there is no link between regime 
type and economic growth, and once human capital is controlled for, the positive 
relationship between growth and democracy vanishes. This inconsistency in findings has 
led some to argue that it is not the regime type but rather the quality of institutional 
arrangements that affects economic development. (North 1989) According to Przeworski 
and Limongi (1993), ―political institutions do matter for growth, but thinking in terms of 
regimes does not seem to capture the relative differences‖ (in de Soysa 2003:75). The 
proponents of this view argue that the quality of economic and political institutions is a 
major determinant of economic performance. (North 1990; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001; Bardhan 2004; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004) Another 
perspective on development argues that ―patterns of development are shaped by an 
exogenously given natural environment, ‗geography‘.‖ (Przerworski 2004). In this 
perspective, there are several ways in which geography, climate and ecology can impact a 
nation‘s prosperity. According to this approach climate can impact work effort, 
incentives, productivity as well as technology available to society (Acemoglu et al. 
2001). Geographical location may also be linked to poverty by affecting the disease 
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burden of a society (Sachs 2000). For the purpose of this study, political extraction is the 
variable of interest to incorporate the role of politics in the process of development.   
The above review shows that the literature on capital flows and development has 
ambiguous findings and is disjointed between the various perspectives within economics, 
sociology and political science. Empirical research on the capital flows and development 
nexus mainly focuses on FDI flows or aggregate capital flows rather than evaluating the 
developmental impact of each form of capital flow separately. And finally most studies 
almost entirely disregard the role of politics in the process of development. 
The current research tackles these issues from a comprehensive and much-needed 
perspective that draws upon these multiple disciplines because as put by one scholar, ―in 
no other field of social sciences are politics and economics so closely intertwined as in 
the study of development.‖ (Bates 1988 in de Soysa 2003) And yet, influential economic 
literature on development ignores the research in political science while the notable 
studies in other social sciences downplay the important contribution of the economics 
literature in understanding the issues around growth and development.  
  
40 
 
 
Chapter - 3 
Model of Analysis 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to propose a model that looks at the impact of 
capital flows on economic development and growth. Although conflicting views in the 
literature exist on the finance and growth relationship, this study aims to revisit the 
relationship between capital flows and development in the light of political factors. 
Several methodologies in the literature have been employed to investigate whether 
foreign capital plays a role in economic development and growth. This study is related to 
the paper by Prasad et al. (2007) that explores the links between foreign capital measured 
by current account balance, and economic growth, but differs from them on several 
fronts. Firstly, in addition to using an aggregate measure of capital flows, like the current 
account balance, this study looks separately at each of the main foreign capital flows, i.e. 
foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and other financial investments. Furthermore, 
due to the growing importance of remittances as a significant source of capital, this study 
analyzes the developmental impact of remittances. Finally, foreign capital alongside, 
domestic sources of capital are considered.   
Other distinguishing aspect of this research includes looking at the economic as 
well as the political determinants of development. Although a growing body of literature 
on the impact of political institutions on growth exists in political science and sociology, 
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it does not provide adequate treatment to the economic determinants of growth. Some of 
the most prominent studies, even in the field of developmental economics, simply ignore 
finance (Levine 1997). Similarly, a lot of the growth and development literature in 
economics downplays the importance of political factors. To overcome this gap, this 
study looks at RPE as a measure of political performance. As already explained in 
Chapter 2, not much is known of interactive relationship RPE, RPR and RPA, whereas 
RPE measures have been empirically tested and shown to be reliable. Therefore political 
extraction offers a valid assessment of political performance that focuses on the ability of 
a government to extract resources to implement a given set of policies.    
This research finds that not all capital flows are created equal; hence, different 
capital flows will produce varying developmental impacts given the developmental level 
and the political performance of a country. The related paper by Prasad et al. (2007) 
argues that in non-industrialized developing economies foreign capital (measured by their 
composite indicator) does not contribute to economic growth – however their analysis on 
FDI flows shows them to be growth inducing. In fact, in a country that lacks the 
absorptive capacity due to weak political and institutional structures, inflow of external 
finance is directly correlated to the overvaluation of currency causing the Dutch disease.  
For their analysis, Prasad et al. (2007) use current account balance which is the 
difference between a country‘s saving and investment, as a measure of ―net capital, 
including private and official capital, flowing in or out of the country.‖ (2007:154) The 
authors further observe that capital does not seem to flow from rich countries to poor 
countries as text book theories suggest, but rather the reverse pattern seems to hold, a 
phenomenon called the ―Lucas Paradox.‖ The authors choose current account balance as 
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their variable of choice because it is a composite measure of all the capital that leaves the 
country minus all capital coming into a country. Then they evaluate whether foreign 
capital contributes to development by augmenting domestic resources. Their conclusions 
find that countries with poorly developed financial markets are unable to reap the benefits 
of external capital, and in a poor institutional setting, external capital may do more 
damage than good.  
The authors pose some interesting questions; however, a problem with their 
analysis is the use of a composite measure of current account balance to analyze the 
impact of foreign capital. Different forms of capital flows have different developmental 
impacts on the economy which makes the use of composite measures problematic. As the 
authors‘ note in their analysis, the capital flows and growth pattern does not hold for FDI, 
where FDI and portfolio flows form 45% of total capital inflows to developing countries
6
. 
According to the authors, fast growing countries do utilize FDI, but they do not utilize 
more capital overall. Another drawback of the Prasad et al. (2007) study is the 
classification of their country sample. They lump most of the emerging market countries 
in their non-industrial, non-transition country sample. Given the success of the emerging 
markets in recent years, such a classification is misleading and does not provide a path of 
progress to poor countries trying to move along the scale of development.   
This study isolates the various forms of capital flows to study their developmental 
impacts on a country‘s economy. For this purpose, the study uses the basic components 
of capital flows, viz., foreign direct investment, portfolio investments, other investments, 
and remittances. Domestic sources of capital in the form of domestic savings are also 
                                                 
6
 (Henry 2006) 
43 
considered, since Prasad et al (2007) posit that, it is the weak institutional structure and 
not the lack of savings, which is the primary obstacle to growth in poor countries. 
Another motivating factor for using domestic savings in the analysis is that the textbook 
theory does not differentiate between domestic and foreign sources of financing. 
Therefore, this study looks at domestic sources of finance to consider whether domestic 
capital is more efficient than foreign capital in countries at low levels of political 
performance. Another justification for the inclusion of domestic capital is to test the 
claim that domestic agents have an advantage over foreign agents in overcoming the 
obstacles of corruption, weak institutions, and infra-structure issues. (Aizenman and 
Spiegel 2004)  
Finally, in addition to considering the above mentioned sources of foreign capital 
this study also looks at the role of remittances on economic development. Recent trends 
show that remittances have become increasingly important for the economic development 
of poor countries. Some studies have shown that remittances are the second most 
important source of external capital after FDI, in developing countries. (Ratha 2003) In 
addition to becoming an important source of external financing, remittances are also a 
stable source of funding in comparison to FDI (Buch and Kuckulenz 2004; Ratha 2003; 
World Bank 2010). Despite their importance, the literature on the linkages between 
remittances and economic growth is still in its infancy. In Latin America, remittances are 
becoming increasingly important and according to one source,  
[Remittances] are considerably more important than official development 
assistance (ODA) and equal the foreign direct investment (FDI) volume for the 
region. In some of the poorest countries of the hemisphere (Haiti, Guyana and 
Honduras, to name a few) they account for more than 10% of the GDP, and, in 
several Latin American countries, remittances per capita readings are higher than 
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the GDP per capita of the poorest 40% of the population.‖ (Blossier 2010: 
http://www.coha.org/migradollars-and-economic-development/) 
 
Despite these benefits, remittances can also have negative impacts such as 
contributing to Dutch disease (Ratha 2003). Thus evaluating the impact of various forms 
of capital given the development level of the economy is essential, as different flows may 
bring about varying impacts. The other contribution of this study is to show that the 
determinants of growth and development are not the same; hence the study tests two 
models for economic growth and economic development. The study aims to evaluate if 
the factors that influence growth also bring about development, and what factors explain 
the cases of growth without development.   
 
Theoretical Framework 
This section looks at the conceptual framework which motivates the estimating 
equations. The element of interest in this study is to look at the determinants of growth as 
well as the determinants of development. In the first part of the analysis, the goal is to 
specify a statistical model of cross country growth regressions that looks at various 
determinants of growth including initial conditions. Much of the empirical work on 
growth uses the Solow Model as a baseline for the analysis. Keeping in line with the 
literature on economic growth, a standard production function of the following form is 
considered:  
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(1) 
 
( , , , )
where,
Y= Real Gross Domestic Product
K= Domestic Capital Stock
L= Labour Inputs
F= Foreign Capital Stock
t= time
Y F K L F t
 
 
Using the basic Solow framework, cross country growth regressions can be 
derived as shown in the work of Barro (1991). Based on the work of Durlauf et al. 
(2004), Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford (1996), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995), this study uses the following cross-country regression. 
 
 (2) 
1ct ct ct ct cty X Z         
 
where ct  denotes the overall growth in country c at time t. , ,  and   are the output 
elasticities; ctX  and 1cty   define the variables that are a part of the Solow Model as 
shown in (1) and ctZ are the determinants of growth that are outside the Solow model. For 
the purpose of this study, the standard equation presented in equation (2) is applied to 
panel data analysis. The following equation specifies the variables ctX  and ctZ  that are 
employed in this analysis. 
The issues around proposing a model of development are more complex. For this 
dissertation, the motivating model for testing the determinants of development is based 
on Arbetman and Johnson (forthcoming) who using infant mortality as a measure of 
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human development in a sample of 53 African countries, explore the economic and 
political foundations of human development. Their model considers human development 
as a function of foreign capital inflows (using FDI flows and foreign Aid), political 
performance, and demographic factors.
7
 While their study is limited to the oil and non-oil 
producing countries of Africa, this dissertation extends their proposed model to a larger 
group of LDCs and considers all available forms of capital (foreign and domestic) to 
explore the underpinnings of development.  
 
Estimating Equations 
The models that this study estimates are of the following form: 
 
 
 
 Growth economic factors,  political performanceF
 Development economic factors,  political performanceF  
 
Thus the estimation strategy is to run regressions of the following form: 
 
 (3) 
 
0 1
2 3
4 5 6
/
/ /
ct ct ct ct
ct ct ct ct
ct ct ct ct
Growth IntialGDPcapita DomesticSavings GDP
ForeignCapital GDP CurrentAccountBalance GDP
RPE WorkingPopulation Controls
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Arbetman and Johnson(2009) test the following model: 
InfantMortality PoliticalPerformance FDIInflows ForeignAid OilProduction Year error     
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And for looking at the determinants of development in LDCs, the following equation is 
employed: 
 
 (4) 
 
0 2
3 4
5 6
/ /
/
ct ct ct ct ct
ct ct ct
ct ct ct
Development DomesticSavings GDP ForeignCapital GDP
CurrentAccountBalance GDP RPE
WorkingPopulation Controls
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
The results are reported using four specifications, across disaggregated samples of 
the dataset in various dimensions; the countries are divided, using GDP per capita as 
criteria, into the developed and less developed country samples. Given the extraordinary 
performance of emerging markets, a separate category for emerging markets is included 
in the analysis, where the list of countries in the emerging markets is based on the 
Standard and Poor‘s (S&P) classification. The motivation for reporting the results by 
these varied specifications can be found in various studies on foreign capital and growth, 
which argue that one reason for the inconclusive evidence in literature is due to 
inaccurate pooling of developing and developed countries into the same sample. 
(Blonigen and Wang 2004) The other consideration behind this pooling is to isolate the 
detriments of growth and development and provide some insight into how nations at low-
levels of development can move up the scale of development to join the ranks of 
emerging markets and finally that of high-income countries.  
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Variables and Data 
This section describes all the variables that are a part of the empirical model. The 
data is collected for 120 countries from 1980-2007. The findings are further reported for 
sub-samples of developed countries, emerging markets and less-developed countries. 
This study utilizes a composite measure of capital as well as disaggregated capital flows. 
Most of the capital flows data is in current US dollars. Because current series are 
influenced by inflation, the financial data is presented as a ratio to GDP. The following 
variables are considered for this study. 
 
CA-GDP: Current Account balance as a percentage of GDP is used as a composite 
measure of foreign capital, consistent with Prasad et al (2007). Current account balance, 
according to WDI database, ―is the sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and 
net current transfers.‖ (World Bank 2010: http://data.worldbank.org/) The data on current 
account comes from the IFS CD-ROM (2010) as well as from World Bank‘s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database (2010). Both data are comparable and the more 
complete series is utilized. 
 
FDI/GDP: Foreign Direct Investment flows in current US dollar data also comes from 
the IFS CD-ROM (2010) as well as from World Bank‘s WDI database (2010). This series 
shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy 
from foreign investors. Because the data is in current US dollars, it is presented as a ratio 
to GDP.  
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FPI/GDP: Foreign Portfolio Investment refers to ―non-FDI cross-border investment in 
equity and debt securities.‖(IMF Balance of payments and international investment 
position manual 2009:110) Data on FPI in also in current US dollar and is taken from the 
IFS CD-ROM (2010) as well as from World Bank‘s WDI database (2010). FPI flows are 
also presented as a ratio to GDP 
 
OFI: Other Foreign Investments data which includes bank loans and trade-related lending 
is in current US dollars and is retrieved from the IFS CD-ROM (2010) and is presented as 
a ratio to GDP. 
 
Remit/GDP: Data on workers‘ remittances data in current US dollars is taken from the 
World Bank‘s WDI database (2010) and is presented as a ratio to GDP. 
 
Save/GDP: Domestic Savings is used as a proxy for domestic resources for the purpose 
of this study. Savings here is ―equal to gross national savings less the value of 
consumption of fixed capital‖ (World Bank 2010: http://data.worldbank.org/). The 
motivation for using domestic savings as a proxy of domestic capital comes from Prasad 
et al. (2007). This data is in current US dollars and is taken from the World Bank‘s WDI 
database (2010) and is presented as a ratio to GDP.  
 
ODA/GDP: For the LDC category, aid data is used in addition to the other financial 
flows. The use of foreign aid in the LDC sample is motivated by Arbetman and Johnson. 
(forthcoming) The data on aid or net official development assistance is taken from World 
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Bank‘s WDI (2010) and ―consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms 
(net of repayments of principal) and grants‖ (World Bank 2010: 
http://data.worldbank.org/). This data is in current US dollars and is presented as a ratio 
to GDP. 
 
Work: Measure for size of the working population as a ratio to total population is 
extracted from WDI (2010) database. 
 
Second: Secondary education data is taken from WDI database and provides the ratio of 
total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population. According to the World Bank, 
―secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the 
primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human 
development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more 
specialized teachers.‖ (World Bank 2010: http://data.worldbank.org/). 
 
RPE: The political performance variable (RPE) is based on Arbetman and Kugler. (1997) 
Relative political extraction measure gives the capacity of a government to extract 
resources from its population. Based on the work of Arbetman and Kugler, (1997) and 
Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. (forthcoming), RPE is calculated as follows:  
Actual Tax
Predicted Tax
RPE 
8
 
                                                 
8
 Arbetman and Kugler (1997) employ the following models for calculating RPE: 
0 1 2 3 4/ / / /Tax GDP time Mining GDP Agriculture GDP Exports GDP          
  5 / ctCrudeOilExports TotalExports    
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Several other measures of political performance exist in the literature such as 
measures of democracy, corruption, governance indicators etc. This study uses Relative 
Political Extraction (RPE) as a measure of political performance. An important benefit of 
using RPE as a measure of performance is that it is independent of regime type. A 
detailed treatment of the RPE measure is found in Arbetman and Kugler, (1997).  
 
GDP per Capita: This is ―gross domestic product divided by midyear population‖ (WDI 
2010).This data is taken from World Bank‘s, World Development Indicators. Data are in 
constant 2000 US dollars. The data on GDP (gross domestic product) is extracted from 
the WDI database. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Growth/Gy: The data on Growth of GDP per capita is taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and gives annual percentage growth rate of GDP per 
capita based on constant local currency. The growth data is also cross-referenced by 
calculating annual growth rates by the formulae provided below.  
For Panel Data by country Gy is calculated as:  
   Gy= ln Y Y 1t t      
The growth rates used in cross-sectional analysis are also calculated by using the formula 
below.  
For Cross Section:  
   Gy ln[ Yt) Y(0 ] / t    
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where, y is the GDP per capita measured in constant 2000 US dollars and Gy is the 
growth rate calculated by the formulae above. 
In addition to Growth, this analysis also looks at whether and how different forms of 
foreign capital contribute to the social/human development aspects of poor countries.  
Several attempts are present in the literature to measure human development, most 
notable is HDI. However, HDI data is only available in five-year intervals and it does not 
monitor progress in the short-term – it takes time before policy interventions reflect on 
HDI indicators. To overcome this, this analysis uses life expectancy at birth, to measure 
of the rate of development as an alternative to GDP per capita.  
 
Life Expectancy: Life expectancy at birth data ―indicates the number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the 
same throughout its life‖ (World Bank 2010: http://data.worldbank.org/). A similar 
measure to capture human development has been used in the work of Lutz (1995). 
 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the variables considered for this 
analysis. However, as noted above, countries at different phases in their development, 
differ in their ability to utilize investments for growth and may also vary in the relative 
importance of economic, political or demographic factors for development. To provide a 
snapshot of the differences in the country samples, the next section briefly discuses the 
choice of samples by levels of development and presents summary statistics in each 
category. A complete listing of countries used in this study is presented in Appendix A. 
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   Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Whole Sample  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per Cap 3816 6197.634 8676.35 97.47 54482.13 
Life Expectancy 3701 64.23717 10.95348 26.41 82.51 
CA /GDP 3722 -2.747273 9.820138 -240.5 56.7 
FDI/GDP 3722 .032196 .2041453 -.5435833 5.663656 
FPI/GDP 3459 .0112529 .1969966 -.1285347 7.328938 
Remittance/GDP 3195 .0187416 .0386861 0.0000003747 .3103261 
OFI/GDP 3702 3.19e-08 3.04e-07 -7.78e-06 5.60e-06 
Savings/GDP 3586 .0964441 .1174453 -2.49803 1.355369 
EAP 3816 .6690854 .1055926 .36 .91 
RPE 3816 1.017488 .5071147 .0133 4.5816 
 
Country Categories 
Three country categories are used for this analysis, viz. developed countries (DC), 
emerging financial markets (EFM) and less-developed countries (LDC). Studies on 
growth and development either pool the countries together or group them in different 
income-based categories following the World Bank convention which uses GDP per 
capita as a means of distinction. Other classifications include OECD and non-OECD 
countries, industrialized, non-industrialized or transition countries. Based on the World 
Bank classification, high income countries here are referred to as developed countries. 
The World Bank term of developing countries denotes a set of low and middle income 
economies. This classification becomes very complex when involving the emerging 
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markets (traditionally viewed as developing countries) which have experienced 
significant growth in recent years. For this dissertation, countries in the group of less-
developed countries are classified as developing countries (low and lower-middle 
income) excluding the emerging markets.   
The third group reported in this dissertation is the emerging markets. According 
to Beim and Calomiris (2001), the phrase ―emerging markets‖ caught on in the 1990s as 
countries moved away from state-sponsored methods of development towards opening 
their economies to foreign capital (primarily foreign private capital). ―The International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group, began using 
the phrase ―emerging markets‖ to describe a set of countries for which they kept and 
published standardized stock indexes starting in 1981.‖ (Beim and Calomiris 2001:2) 
This research utilizes the S&P classification of emerging financial markets.
9
 Table 3, 
Table 4 and Table 5 report summary statistics in each category (DC, EFM and LDC) 
from 1980-2007 to show the differences across the three groups and further justify the 
categorization of data in these country sub-samples. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
9
 S&P classifies 19 countries as emerging markets based on ―macroeconomic conditions; political stability; 
legal property rights and procedures; trading and settlement processes and conditions; and feedback from 
institutional investors.‖ (Standard & Poor‘s Financial Services LLC 2011) 
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   Table 3: Summary Statistics DC 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Growth 686 2.256895 2.271266 -7.52 10.38 
gdpcap2000wb 686 20633.9 8708.655 3221.44 54482.13 
Life Expectancy 650 77.11986 2.254448 65.8 82.51 
Save/GDP 686 0.081632 0.054387 -0.06483 0.281214 
FDI/GDP 686 0.077819 0.460602 -0.15017 5.663656 
FPI/GDP 663 0.053874 0.447527 -0.12853 7.328938 
Remit/GDP 454 0.005001 0.013204 0 0.090299 
CA/GDP 686 -0.45386 4.962257 -23.96 17.32 
OFI/GDP 678 0.068053 0.280273 -0.90105 3.966948 
RPE 686 1.03758 0.346516 0.19 2.4 
second 686 971.5994 476.4174 223 3012 
work 686 0.63172 0.109122 0.29 0.85 
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   Table 4: Summary Statistics EFM 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Growth 464 2.976832 4.423988 -14.32 13.7 
gdpcap2000wb 471 3342.426 4168.02 208.17 28964.15 
Life Expectancy 462 67.57779 5.497647 51.77 80.44 
Save/GDP 465 0.142352 0.097808 -0.24656 0.436532 
FDI/GDP 470 0.027867 0.04116 -0.02758 0.520416 
FPI/GDP 467 0.003988 0.010916 -0.0458 0.103422 
Remit/GDP 373 0.018037 0.029153 0 0.145835 
CA/GDP 470 -0.51087 5.905837 -14.7 26.64 
OFI/GDP 470 0.012146 0.053861 -0.22849 0.424991 
RPE 471 0.993631 0.420889 0.16 2.53 
second 471 672.9066 197.689 214 1124 
work 471 0.566072 0.099328 0.33 0.84 
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  Table 5: Summary Statistics LDC 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Growth 2059 1.13852 5.14756 -46.89 37.84 
GDP per Cap 2132 2226.9 3344.89 100.49 22302.4 
Life 
Expectancy 
2102 60.2525 10.3078 26.41 79.39 
Save/GDP 1954 0.08429 0.13564 -2.498 1.35537 
FDI/GDP 2066 0.02353 0.05753 -0.5436 1.45202 
FPI/GDP 1834 0.00061 0.00563 -0.098 0.13381 
Remit/GDP 1913 0.02436 0.04505 0 0.31033 
CA/GDP 2066 -4.0728 11.5611 -240.5 54.67 
OFI/GDP 2055 0.01997 0.36725 -7.7799 5.59732 
RPE 2132 1.0094 0.49961 0.01 3.46 
second 2132 466.807 327.97 3 1528 
work 2132 0.5165 0.17348 0.02 0.9 
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Chapter - 4 
Analysis and Findings 
 
 
This analysis employs various techniques, disaggregated in various dimensions in 
order to confirm the findings and get robust results. The study employs country-level data 
based on 120 countries (26 developed countries, 18 emerging markets and 77 developing 
countries) from 1980-2007. The countries in the sample are selected based on data 
availability for the maximum time-period. A complete list of the countries included in the 
study is provided in Appendix A.  
 
Reporting Specifications 
The following four specifications are used throughout the analysis to report the 
findings: 
[1] Basic Specification  
[2] Basic Specification, excluding Domestic Savings/GDP variable 
[3] Extended Specification considering the Interaction of RPE with Financial 
Variables 
[4] Extended Specification considering the Interaction of RPE with Financial 
Variables, excluding Domestic Savings/GDP variable 
Separate models for domestic savings are used to isolate the impact of domestic 
savings on current account balance. The motivation for using models with and without 
59 
savings comes from Prasad, et al. (2007) argue that the relationship between current 
account balance and growth runs through domestic savings. To test this assertion, the 
basic and the extended models are presented once with and once without the domestic 
savings variable. 
To check which specification is superior (basic or extended), Wald test
10
 is 
performed to test the joint significance of the interaction-term variables used in the 
extended specification. The Wald test is a method of testing the significance of particular 
explanatory variables to determine whether the variables should be included in the model. 
The results of the Wald test
11
  indicate that the extended model is appropriate for the 
analysis. In addition to the above mentioned specifications, the data is reported for the 
following sub-samples: 
 Whole Dataset 
 Developed Countries Sample (DC) 
 Emerging Financial Markets (EFM) 
 Less Developed Countries Sample (LDC) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are several motivations for presenting 
the results in various samples. First, the impact of economic and political variables on 
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 Wald test ―performs tests of simple and composite linear hypotheses about the parameters of the most 
recently fitted model‖ (Stata11 Manual 2011) 
 
11
 Performing Wald Test for testing Joint Significance of the following variables:  
 ( 1)  FDI_RPE = 0 
 ( 2)  FPI_RPE = 0 
 ( 3)  OFI_RPE = 0 
 ( 4)  CA_RPE = 0 
 ( 5)  Remit_RPE = 0 
 ( 6)  Save_RPE = 0 
 
           chi2(  6) =   16.54 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0111 
 
Because the Wald test is significant as seen above, we cannot assume that the parameters associated with 
these variables are zero; therefore, it makes sense to include these variables in the model. 
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growth is expected to be different for developed and developing countries. Next, given 
the outstanding growth of the EFM, especially the BRIC countries (a term coined by the 
Goldman Sachs Report BRICs and Beyond, detailing the success of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and fourteen other EFMs), it is reasonable to present the results for EFM countries 
separately from developing countries. Furthermore, for LDC sample, in addition to 
growth in GDP per capita as a measure of Economic Growth, Life Expectancy at birth is 
used as a dependent variable to determine whether the determinants of growth and 
development are indeed the same. Results are reported using both dependent variables. 
Finally, five-year panels (averaging data every five years) are also used for the entire 
dataset as a matter of robustness and assemble a clear picture of growth over shorter 
periods of time. Results from five-year panels are reported in the appendices for 
comparison with other existing cross-section and panel-data studies. Averaging five-year 
data is also a standard technique employed in the growth literature that utilizes panel-
data. The results of five-year averaged data are reported in the appendices and provide 
further robustness for the findings. 
 
Estimation Methods  
Several estimation techniques are considered in this dissertation based on existing 
literature on the determinants of growth and development. This analysis uses cross-
sectional regressions to establishing correlations. A large number of macroeconomic 
studies on the determinants of economic growth are based on the cross-sectional 
regression analysis; therefore it is very useful to look at the cross-sectional variation in 
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the data. A limitation of the cross-sectional method however, is the inability to exploit 
time series variation in the data.  
Running an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression on the entire data is usually 
a first-step in most empirical work. A pooled OLS regression is applied to the entire 
dataset without taking into consideration the panel nature of the dataset. It is the most 
basic form of regression; however, if there is a problem of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation/autocorrelation in the data, the OLS results are inefficient. Furthermore, OLS 
method does not have the ability to exploit the time-series variation in the data; therefore, 
panel evidence is used to check whether a consistent relationship holds between foreign 
and domestic sources of capital, political performance and development.  
To decide on which method to use in panel data analysis, it is important to check 
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. To test for serial correlation, the Wooldridge 
test
12
 for serial correlation is used to test the null hypothesis of no first order 
autocorrelation. To check for heteroskedasticity the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier
13
 
test is used for testing the null hypothesis of constant variance. The results from these 
tests show the data to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. To correct for the problem 
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 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     135) =     45.769 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
The Wooldridge test is significant; therefore there is a problem of serial correlation in the data. 
 
 
13
 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of Gy 
 
         chi2(1)      =   167.12 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
The test is significant so the null hypothesis of constant variance is rejected. 
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of serial correlation in panel data model, the method of Prais-Winsten is used. This 
method is used to estimate the parameters β when autocorrelation is specified14.  
For panel data, running a fixed-effects model is usually a reasonable thing to do 
because it always yields consistent results; however, it may not be the most efficient 
model and seldom yields useful findings. To compare the explanatory power of the 
Fixed-Effects model with the Prais-Winsten model, Hausman
15
 test is employed. 
Hausman test ―checks a more efficient model against a less efficient but consistent model 
to make sure that the more efficient model also gives consistent results.‖ (Warin 2007) 
Hausman test shows Prais-Winsten to be the ideal method of estimation. However, it is 
important to note that the more qualified findings are ones that are consistently observed 
and confirmed using various methods of estimation and various disaggregations of the 
data; therefore results are reported using cross-sectional analysis, OLS method, fixed-
effects model and the ideal analysis given the nature of this dataset, i.e., Prais-Winsten 
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 According to Stata Manual (2011), when autocorrelation with panel-specific coefficients of correlation is 
specified, as is the case here, ―each panel-level ρi is computed from the residuals of an OLS regression 
across all panels‖. 
 
The panel-by-panel covariance matrix of the disturbances denoted by m m

 is computed as: 
^
' /m m i j ijT   with i and j

being the respective residuals for panels i and j respectively and ij
T
 
being the number of residuals between i and j. The pairwise selection is used, and 
^
ijS  is computed using 
all observations which are matched by the time period (in this case yearly) between the two panels i and j. 
The Prais-Winsten regression using the procedure described above produces panel corrected standard errors 
for cross-sectional time-series models with first order autocorrelation and panel-specific AR (1) process. 
 
15
     Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        0.13 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.7204 
 
Since the P-value is insignificant, it is safe to use Prais-Winsten Regression 
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analysis. The following section reports the findings using the above mentioned methods. 
Throughout the body of the analysis, only Prias-Winsten regression result tables are 
presented the evidence from the remainder of the estimation techniques are presented in 
the appendices.   
 
Whole Sample Evidence 
A large number of existing macroeconomic studies on the connection between 
capital and growth are based on cross-sectional analysis following Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995); Balasubramanyam et al. (1996); Durlauf et al. (2004). For the purpose of 
this analysis, cross-sectional evidence is presented for the entire sample 1980-2007, as 
well as using three time periods, that is 1980-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2007 reported 
in Appendix E. This is to confirm findings across various dimensions and compare results 
with existing studies on the capital-growth nexus. In the first period (1980-1990), FDI 
across all four specifications is positive and significant, while other forms of flows such 
as FPI and OFI (bank loans etc.) as well as domestic savings are negative and 
insignificant. This is not surprising because the period of 1979-1982 was a bit of a 
lending frenzy as sovereign loans were syndicated to many small banks that made some 
very high risk loans to developing countries. (Beim and Calomiris 2001) This risky 
lending frenzy primarily fueled by the petro-dollars led to debt crisis in various LDCs in 
East Asia and Latin America, the most notable of which were Brazil and Mexico. 
However, as the debt crisis was ending, private capital flows started resuming especially 
to East Asia and the results from 1980-1990 reflect a positive impact of FDI on growth in 
this period. As noted above, the results from this cross-sectional analysis, although 
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intuitive and interesting have limitations because the time-series dimension of the data is 
not exploited, nor do these results tell us which group of countries are primarily driving 
the results.  
The 1990-2000 time-period marked a surge in private capital, especially FDI, to 
the emerging markets as well as the post-communist transition countries. However, the 
period was also affected by two major crises, i.e. the Mexican peso crisis and the East-
Asian financial crisis. The cross-section results from this period show that the all forms 
of capital are negative and insignificant across all specifications, with the exception of 
FPI in the basic specification without savings. The only form of capital that seems to 
have a positive impact on growth in all specifications is domestic capital represented by 
domestic savings. Moreover, when savings is excluded from the model, Current Account 
balance seems to also be positively related to growth, which shows that the positive sign 
on the current account is being driven by domestic resources. There is also no evidence 
for a notable impact of RPE in this time period. The period 2000-2007 also shows a 
positive impact of domestic resources on growth, as well as the positive link between 
current account and growth, driven by domestic savings.  
The cross sectional analysis showed one consistent finding throughout the three 
samples, i.e. that current account surplus seems to be positively related to growth, once 
domestic savings are excluded from the model. In other words, domestic sources of 
finance seem to be the driver of growth. This finding is also a confirmation of the study 
by Prasad et al. (2007), who find in their cross-sectional analysis that ―correlation 
between current account and growth is positive and stems largely from a relationship 
between domestic saving and growth‖ (2007:170). This finding is however inconsistent 
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with neo-classical economic theory which holds that foreign capital permits capital-
starved poor countries to grow by augmenting their resources. Solow model also argued 
that savings is not a determinant of long term growth. Because cross-sectional analysis 
has limited estimation power, and it is possible to pick up a phenomenon inherent in the 
life-cycle of countries, alternative methods are used to explore the link between various 
forms of capital (foreign and domestic), political performance via RPE and development.  
Pooled OLS regression applied to the entire dataset, (which does not have the 
ability to consider the panel nature of the dataset) is a common approach to explore a 
relationship between variables. In the OLS regression applied to the whole dataset, FPI 
has a negative impact on growth in the first two basic specifications and is insignificant 
for the extended specifications. OFI has a positive impact only in the basic specification 
and FDI shows no impact on growth at all. The earlier findings on domestic savings and 
current account balance are also confirmed in this model as current account surplus 
driven by domestic savings, positively affects growth. In this model, RPE is positive and 
significant for growth in the extended model and insignificant for the rest. Surprisingly, 
remittances show a negative impact on growth only in the extended specification and are 
insignificant for the rest; however, the interaction between RPE and remittances shows a 
positive impact on growth. This is intuitive because, unless there is capacity to absorb 
remittances and use them for productive channels, they may not have implications for 
growth and in some scenarios can even lead to Dutch disease as noted by Ratha (2003). 
However, this finding requires confirmation across developed country and developing 
country samples. Along the same lines, current account surplus and OFI, when interacted 
with RPE show a positive impact on growth in the both the extended specifications, 
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which all point to the importance of performance in absorbing external resources for 
growth. The finding on the positive relationship between growth and the interaction 
between RPE and current account goes a step further than the argument made by Prasad 
et al. (2007) who argue that the positive relationship between current account and growth 
runs through domestic savings. This finding shows that it is the combination of domestic 
savings and political performance that leads to growth, because capable governments can 
use savings to promote growth. To find further confirmation of these findings, panel data 
analysis is employed. 
16
 
Prais-Winsten regression results reported in Table 6 reported below, lend 
additional credence to the initial findings on savings, current account surplus and political 
performance and current account interaction promoting growth. Panel-data applied to the 
whole sample shows further evidence for a positive impact of FDI and OFI on growth in 
the basic specification and is insignificant for the extended specification. To explore 
these findings further, it is important to divide the data in sub-samples to explore whether 
developed countries, with high levels of political performance and financial development, 
are driving these results.  
A consistent finding throughout these various methods, however, is that while 
foreign capital flows are not always growth-inducing, domestic sources of financing are 
crucial for growth. This finding is inconsistent with neo-classical economic theory as 
well as a majority of empirical studies on growth which do not distinguish between 
                                                 
16
 In a panel setting, fixed-effects model always gives consistent results but given the nature of the data, it 
is not the most efficient model to run. The results from the fixed-effects model also confirm the finding 
regarding the positive impact of savings and current account surplus on growth. This model also shows a 
positive impact of FDI, FPI and OFI on growth as well the interaction of political performance with OFI 
and current account balance, respectively, on growth. However, given the nature of the data, as noted 
above, Prais-Winsten regression is the most appropriate method. 
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domestic and foreign sources of investment and give lack of capital as the primary factor 
for underdevelopment. An insightful way to get robust findings as well to check that the 
results are simply not inherent phenomenon in the life cycle of countries, it is important 
to observe growth over short time periods.
17
 To see how this effect holds in short-term, 
five-year panels are used to report findings in the appendices
18
. A fundamental question 
put forward by this research is whether countries at different levels of development are 
impacted differently by various forms of capital. To explore this, the next section turns to 
finding sample-specific evidence for the capital-growth connection in developed and 
developing countries. 
  
                                                 
17
 The motivation of doing this is found in Chinn and Prasad (2003) as well as Prasad, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2007) who argue that poor countries in early stages of their development run current account 
deficits to finance development once they reach a certain level of growth, they run surpluses to pay off 
obligations built up by current account deficits.  
18
 The time periods considered for finding evidence over short periods are 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-
1995, 1995-2000, and 2000-2005 and the results are presented in the appendices. 
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   Table 6: Panel Data Analysis using Prais-Winsten Regression: Whole Sample 
 Growth[1] Growth[2] Growth[3] Growth[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00002 
 (0.82) (1.35) (0.69) (0.85) 
LifeExpectancy 0.06490 0.07405 0.06872 0.07346 
 (3.13)*** (3.66)*** (3.35)*** (3.60)*** 
FDI_GDP 1.34121 1.66088 -0.76183 3.64683 
 (2.74)*** (3.07)*** (0.09) (0.45) 
FPI_GDP -1.69589 -1.80149 -0.84415 -4.15679 
 (2.85)*** (3.00)*** (0.13) (0.66) 
OFI_GDP 2.31606 2.35756 2.27103 2.66486 
 (3.20)*** (3.34)*** (0.95) (1.19) 
Remit_GDP 8.23889 9.37830 6.34689 4.45356 
 (2.27)** (2.79)*** (0.82) (0.64) 
CAofgdp -0.03117 0.00934 -0.17502 -0.10502 
 (1.65)* (0.51) (4.02)*** (2.73)*** 
Save_GDP 7.19215  9.42666  
 (5.14)***  (3.33)***  
RPE -0.49765 -0.21024 -0.02329 -0.17560 
 (1.97)** (0.89) (0.06) (0.63) 
work 0.79891 0.94189 1.11206 1.05052 
 (1.04) (1.24) (1.43) (1.38) 
FDI_RPE   2.00279 -1.88005 
   (0.25) (0.25) 
FPI_RPE   -0.73475 2.36531 
   (0.12) (0.39) 
OFI_RPE   0.00892 -0.39489 
   (0.00) (0.17) 
CA_RPE   0.14697 0.11708 
   (4.05)*** (3.96)*** 
Remit_RPE   2.28076 5.35334 
   (0.37) (0.92) 
Save_RPE   -2.28654  
   (1.17)  
_cons -3.53784 -3.73938 -4.41998 -3.83244 
 (2.67)*** (2.91)*** (3.23)*** (2.98)*** 
R
2
 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 
N 2,382 2,453 2,382 2,453 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Developed Country Evidence 
The results from Prais-Winsten regression results reported in Table-7 (the ideal 
estimation for this analysis), show a positive impact of FDI and OFI on growth for all 
specifications, this effect is also significant for FDI in specification [1] and [2] and 
significant for OFI in [1]. FPI is negative and non-significant. This is as expected, while 
FDI is expected to be positive in developed countries with high absorptive capacity and 
advanced financial markets, FPI and OFI are not the most efficient forms of external 
finance. This finding is also consistent with Iyer et al. (2004) who find FDI to be more 
growth inducing than FPI and OFI in a sample of 20 OECD countries.  
The impact of domestic savings on growth is also positive in the DC sample. 
Furthermore, while current account balance is negative and significant for growth in [1], 
there is no evidence for a positive and significant impact of current account balance on 
growth in this sample. This implies that the ability of advanced industrialized economies 
to run current account deficits or to be net borrowers of capital positively impacts their 
ability to grow, or interpreted conservatively, it does not hinder their ability to grow. As 
expected, political performance is positive and significant in the [1] and [3] and 
insignificant for the rest, pointing to the role of a capable government in improving the 
absorptive capacity of capital.  
These findings supports the argument by Prasad et al. (2007) that in rich 
countries, higher institutional development allows investment to be more responsive to 
productivity increases and allows citizens to borrow against future wealth
19
.  The 
                                                 
19
 Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) argue that industrial countries run current account deficits 
because investment is relatively more responsive to productivity increases than savings. This argument is 
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coefficient on the size of the working population is positive and significant in [2] and [4] 
which are expected because labor is an important factor in growth. Nevertheless, when 
savings is included in the model, the sign on working population turns negative and 
becomes insignificant. Partly, this is because size of the working population in some 
ways is an important determinant of savings. Another interpretation of this finding is that 
in advanced countries, high levels of growth can be associated with shrinking 
populations. It is also possible to have growth in presence of unemployment. Finally this 
result could also point to the inequitable distributional effects of growth in advanced 
countries.  
Secondary education, as expected, has a positive impact on growth as is expected 
for advanced countries. Life expectancy is insignificant for growth, because advanced 
countries in general have met the threshold of human development. Finally, the 
interactions of these terms with RPE do not seem significant for this sample. The next 
section looks at the emerging financial markets. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
also supported by Glick and Rogoff (1995) who demonstrated that productivity increases led to investment 
booms in their sample of Group of Seven leading industrial economies.  
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  Table 7: Panel Data Analysis using Prais-Winsten Regression: DC Sample 
 Growth[1] Growth[2] Growth[3] Growth[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00000 -0.00008 -0.00000 -0.00008 
 (0.19) (3.14)*** (0.07) (3.16)*** 
LifeExpectancy 0.02284 -0.02395 0.02934 -0.02435 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.35) (0.25) 
FDI_GDP 0.78848 1.10654 4.71029 5.35760 
 (2.32)** (2.70)*** (0.67) (0.69) 
FPI_GDP -0.93567 -1.04812 -4.59565 -4.56071 
 (1.62) (1.48) (0.85) (0.75) 
OFI_GDP 1.13654 1.93119 2.68573 2.31962 
 (1.55) (2.27)** (1.09) (0.87) 
CAofgdp -0.14873 0.03437 -0.08458 0.05293 
 (4.17)*** (1.22) (1.01) (0.81) 
Save_GDP 27.71419  34.39177  
 (8.70)***  (5.36)***  
RPE 1.01935 -0.02111 1.40584 0.02887 
 (2.97)*** (0.06) (2.76)*** (0.08) 
work -0.84433 3.23245 -0.84270 3.25538 
 (0.61) (2.08)** (0.60) (2.10)** 
second 0.00003 0.00006 0.00005 0.00007 
 (0.12) (0.24) (0.19) (0.28) 
FDI_RPE   -3.67592 -3.96258 
   (0.56) (0.54) 
FPI_RPE   3.39610 3.33514 
   (0.67) (0.59) 
OFI_RPE   -1.37774 -0.28315 
   (0.60) (0.12) 
CA_RPE   -0.05503 -0.01642 
   (0.72) (0.33) 
Save_RPE   -6.42428  
   (1.05)  
_cons -2.34030 3.55515 -3.36759 3.52007 
 (0.36) (0.47) (0.52) (0.47) 
R
2
 0.31 0.13 0.32 0.12 
N 626 626 626 626 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Emerging Financial Markets Evidence  
The results for emerging financial markets shown in Table 8, show that current 
account balance is negatively associated with growth in all four specifications, whether or 
not savings is included. This shows that emerging financial markets utilize large foreign 
capital inflows and channel them for growth. The political performance variable RPE 
does show a positive growth impact in [3], in the EFM sample and is insignificant in the 
remaining samples. It is plausible to argue that EFMs have not caught up with the most 
developed nations in terms of government efficiency, political stability, governance, 
financial development, control of corruption and infrastructure. The interaction of current 
account and RPE is positive, which shows that capable governments which run current 
account surpluses can promote growth by effective utilization of domestic resources.  
Surprisingly, the coefficient on FDI is positive in [1] and [2] however, it is 
negative and insignificant in the extended specification. This finding should not be taken 
to mean that FDI flows are unimportant for growth and needs to be interpreted with 
caution. While a unanimous positive effect of FDI in EFM is expected, it is misleading to 
assume that FDI inflows yield an automatic positive spillover. Several studies have 
argued that it is in fact the host country characteristics that determine the impact of FDI 
inflows. (Balasubramanyam 1996; Iyer, et al. 2004; Moran et al. 2005) The magnitude 
and significance of the domestic savings coefficient as well as the demographic factors 
provide a possible explanation for interpreting the impact of foreign capital in EFMs. 
First, the presence of high domestic savings shows that internal resources are available to 
domestic firms who wish to compete with foreign firms. Availability of domestic 
resources is also essential for taking advantage of spillovers from FDI in the form of 
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supply chain and backward linkages. Presence of foreign firms can also have other 
positive spillovers such as technology transfer, improvement in managerial skills and 
improvement in the skills of labor. Furthermore, the FDI and RPE interaction is positive 
and significant in both the extended specifications. This also points to the ability of 
capable government to utilize the inflow of foreign capital. 
FPI inflows are positive in all specification and significant in [2], and OFI flows 
are also positive and significant in all specifications. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that FPI and OFI flows lead to the development of host financial markets, 
necessitate institutional development, and improve local managerial skills. (Iyer et al. 
2004) Finally, remittances do not seem to be an important source of external finance for 
the group of EFMs in this sample.  
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  Table 8: Panel Data Analysis using Prais-Winsten Regression: EFM Sample 
 Growth[1] Growth[2] Growth[3] Growth[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00056 -0.00056 -0.00059 -0.00057 
 (3.39)*** (2.97)*** (3.58)*** (3.08)*** 
LifeExpectancy 0.18911 0.18754 0.18328 0.13919 
 (3.01)*** (2.77)*** (2.90)*** (1.98)** 
FDI_GDP 6.27749 7.33607 -16.56473 -34.26131 
 (0.90) (1.02) (0.93) (1.93)* 
FPI_GDP 49.10732 59.65824 105.44622 131.01443 
 (1.62) (1.89)* (1.14) (1.35) 
OFI_GDP 13.57013 19.60875 18.77215 38.05233 
 (1.99)** (2.90)*** (1.05) (2.07)** 
Remit_GDP -11.04733 13.73377 -8.66090 7.33112 
 (0.83) (1.12) (0.68) (0.62) 
CAofgdp -0.10985 -0.00521 -0.45258 -0.15116 
 (1.61) (0.08) (2.39)** (0.99) 
Save_GDP 20.28412  37.20462  
 (4.84)***  (4.26)***  
RPE -0.74449 -1.03790 1.28019 -1.75986 
 (1.07) (1.57) (1.23) (2.43)** 
second -0.00025 0.00108 -0.00087 0.00012 
 (0.21) (0.82) (0.72) (0.09) 
work 0.93014 6.26639 -0.92930 2.89331 
 (0.26) (1.84)* (0.24) (0.81) 
FDI_RPE   41.85033 71.65727 
   (1.56) (2.72)*** 
FPI_RPE   -71.53236 -92.45270 
   (0.69) (0.86) 
OFI_RPE   -1.81630 -15.62221 
   (0.12) (1.01) 
CA_RPE   0.35493 0.16794 
   (2.05)** (1.16) 
Save_RPE   -19.02847  
   (2.85)***  
_cons -11.17548 -12.39120 -11.36003 -6.17635 
 (2.32)** (2.54)** (2.25)** (1.17) 
R
2
 0.16 0.09 0.18 0.12 
N 363 363 363 363 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Less-Developed Country Evidence 
Panel-Data evidence in the LDC sample shown in Table 9, lends further credence 
to the robust relationship between domestic savings and growth. In addition to domestic 
savings, the most important contributor to development in the LDC sample considered 
here seems to be remittances. This is consistent with Ratha (2003)who argues that 
remittances are a consistent and stable source of external financial development for 
economically fragile countries.  
Political performance measured by extraction has less significance for LDCs. A 
plausible explanation is that most of the countries in the LDC sample are afflicted with 
rampant corruption. Therefore, the effects of RPE are neutralized by the presence of 
corruption. As seen in the DC sample, societies that succeed have high performance not 
only in terms of their ability to extract resources but also in how those resources are 
utilized. At low levels of development, corruption chew up RPE and resources are wasted 
in non-productive purposes.  
In this sample, the relationship between current account balance and growth is 
insignificant in the basic specification [1], positive and insignificant in [2] and negative 
and significant in the extended specification. This finding is somewhat inconclusive; even 
so, the interaction of RPE and current account balance is more telling. The coefficient on 
the current account and RPE interaction is both positive and significant, showing that 
less-developed countries can bootstrap growth through building capacity and using 
internal savings.  
Positive relationships are observed between OFI and growth. This is somewhat 
expected because capital-starved countries do depend on bank and other lending as an 
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important source of external finance. This also explains the positive and significant 
coefficient on aid, which is another important source of external capital for structurally 
and economically weak countries. The impact of FPI is insignificant and inconclusive 
and points to the absence of high levels of financial development which are necessary to 
reap the benefits from FPI inflows.  
FDI in the LDC sample is positive for all specifications. Nonetheless, when 
domestic savings are removed from the model, FDI coefficient becomes significant in [2] 
and almost doubles in [4]. One interpretation is that FDI can be growth inducing only 
when domestic resources are employed in taking advantage of the potential externalities 
from multinational activity in a host country. In other words, in situations where domestic 
resources are employed in setting up backward linkages or supply chain catering to the 
subsidiary of a multinational corporation, or there are technological spillovers to 
domestic competitors, can the impact of FDI be positive? This finding may be a negation 
of the widely held assertion that FDI is categorically growth inducing.  
The coefficients on life expectancy, size of working population and secondary 
education as expected are positively related to growth in LDCs. A more interesting 
question is whether the positive impact of aid, FDI and loans on growth observed in the 
LDC sample also leads to development? The question is tackled in the next section.  
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   Table 9: Panel Data Analysis using Prais-Winsten Regression: LDC Sample 
 Growth[1] Growth[2] Growth[3] Growth[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00001 -0.00002 
 (0.96) (1.10) (0.11) (0.25) 
LifeExpectancy 0.06709 0.05163 0.06673 0.04504 
 (2.21)** (1.87)* (2.30)** (1.67)* 
FDI_GDP 6.28728 10.30971 8.86861 17.25472 
 (1.44) (2.43)** (0.70) (1.48) 
FPI_GDP 14.36289 6.40383 -182.48629 -185.85619 
 (0.52) (0.21) (1.47) (1.51) 
OFI_GDP 2.21695 2.01430 2.41467 2.15901 
 (2.49)** (2.39)** (0.97) (0.91) 
Remit_GDP 9.46265 9.32773 10.71127 11.32080 
 (2.30)** (2.44)** (2.76)*** (3.04)*** 
ODA_GDP 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 (3.14)*** (2.18)** (3.26)*** (2.48)** 
CAofgdp -0.00099 0.02285 -0.14213 -0.11148 
 (0.05) (1.22) (3.65)*** (2.93)*** 
Save_GDP 4.70913  3.86509  
 (3.30)***  (2.75)***  
RPE -0.25995 -0.02357 -0.04989 0.13825 
 (0.95) (0.09) (0.15) (0.43) 
work -0.42047 0.32677 -0.01438 0.55054 
 (0.49) (0.40) (0.02) (0.68) 
second 0.00025 0.00061 0.00025 0.00066 
 (0.32) (0.82) (0.32) (0.90) 
FDI_RPE   -2.22946 -6.37179 
   (0.22) (0.66) 
FPI_RPE   183.59697 183.91844 
   (1.64) (1.67)* 
OFI_RPE   -0.52986 -0.52447 
   (0.19) (0.20) 
CA_RPE   0.13540 0.12843 
   (4.30)*** (4.31)*** 
_cons -3.64795 -2.87752 -4.20961 -3.02513 
 (2.16)** (1.87)* (2.59)*** (2.00)** 
R
2
 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 
N 1,588 1,659 1,588 1,659 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Does Growth mean Development? 
To explore whether the determinants of growth and development are same, Life 
Expectancy at birth is used as a proxy for development, the choice of this dependent 
variable is been explained in detail in Chapter 2 and is motivated by Lutz (1995). To 
analyze the impact of capital (foreign and domestic) and political performance on Life 
expectancy at birth as a measure of development, results are reported across four 
specifications
20
 and are presented in Table 10.  
Remittances show a positive and significant impact on development across all 
four specifications. Remittances not only positively impact growth in LDCs, as seen in 
the previous model; they also lead to higher levels of human development. An added 
benefit of remittances that are intended for consumption, they are relatively stable in 
nature Ratha (2003).  
FDI inflows also show a positive impact on development, but it is not significant. 
FPI is positive only in [4] and OFI seems to have a negative impact on development 
altogether. The model also shows that the size of the working population matters for 
development across all four specifications.    
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 [1] Life Expectancy =F(financial variables, domestic savings, controls, RPE) 
    [2] Life Expectancy y=F(financial variables, controls, RPE) 
    [3] Life Expectancy =F(financial variables, Domestic savings,  controls, RPE, interaction between 
financial variables*RPE) 
   [4]  Life Expectancy =F(financial variables, controls, RPE, interaction between financial variables*RPE) 
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When development is measured by life expectancy, there is no evidence on the 
link between savings and development. This result could be a reflection of a loss of 
confidence in local currency or flight of capital. In other words, at low levels of 
development, lack of domestic opportunities of capital may prompt smart savings to 
leave the country, thus reducing development. Finally, current account balance is positive 
and significant in all four specifications, whether or not savings is included in the model, 
which again demonstrates that influx of foreign capital does not lead to development in 
less-developed countries.
21
  
The evidence from using Life Expectancy as a measure of development, 
demonstrated several findings. First, as expected, the analysis showed that the 
determinants of growth and development are not always the same. Second, foreign capital 
does not promote development, as seen by the positive link between current account 
balance and development. Third, remittances show a positive and significant impact on 
development. The finding regarding remittances is intuitive because remittance earnings 
can lead to welfare as noted by Ratha (2003) and can also be reinvested by the recipients. 
The positive, yet insignificant effect of FDI in some ways is also consistent with the line 
of argument that perhaps the error of non-extractive FDI in developing countries is an 
error of omission; because a very minor fraction of world non-extractive FDI makes it to 
very poor countries. Finally, demographic factors affect development more than foreign 
capital, as seen by the positive and consistent impact of the size of working population on 
development.   
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 This finding is similar to Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) who argue that for non-industrial 
countries, foreign capital does not lead to development, using growth in GDP per capita as their measure of 
development.  
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Table 10: Panel Data Analysis using Prais-Winsten Regression: LDC Sample 
 Life 
Expectancy[1] 
Life 
Expectancy[2] 
Life 
Expectancy[3] 
Life 
Expectancy[4] 
FDI_GDP 1.32131 1.05828 4.57988 2.96798 
 (0.68) (0.61) (1.06) (0.78) 
FPI_GDP 7.17167 3.22447 20.89366 -4.38019 
 (0.54) (0.25) (0.45) (0.09) 
OFI_GDP -0.19565 -0.10743 -1.59958 -1.24348 
 (0.73) (0.43) (1.71)* (1.49) 
Remit_GD
P 
27.98417 22.24964 28.51468 23.49011 
 (7.10)*** (6.17)*** (7.62)*** (6.68)*** 
ODA_GDP -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 (4.69)*** (0.02) (4.80)*** (0.02) 
CAofgdp 0.00397 0.00332 0.00218 0.00272 
 (0.41) (0.48) (0.18) (0.29) 
Save_GDP 0.01736  0.19721  
 (0.02)  (0.22)  
RPE -0.08717 0.22536 -0.04778 0.28120 
 (0.34) (0.74) (0.19) (0.92) 
work 3.21108 -2.10275 4.60424 -1.64390 
 (2.57)** (2.02)** (3.81)*** (1.69)* 
second 0.01652 0.01676 0.01701 0.01716 
 (25.75)*** (17.05)*** (29.56)*** (18.20)*** 
FDI_RPE   -2.66830 -1.62996 
   (0.81) (0.57) 
FPI_RPE   -12.41013 6.33461 
   (0.31) (0.15) 
OFI_RPE   1.74042 1.47536 
   (1.59) (1.50) 
CA_RPE   0.00435 0.00389 
   (0.40) (0.40) 
_cons 51.61413 53.55994 50.72111 53.07584 
 (63.32)*** (54.40)*** (67.28)*** (59.24)*** 
R
2
 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
N 1,599 1,679 1,599 1,679 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Robustness Checks using Five-Year Panel Averages 
Because annual growth rates fluctuate a lot, a number of studies use dataset 
presented in five-year averages to get consistent findings (such as Prasad et al. 2007). 
Table 11 presents results by transforming the data into five-year averages. In developed 
countries, current account balance is negatively related to growth confirming the finding 
that advanced countries have the capacity to absorb foreign capital and grow by reliance 
on external finance. While the impact of FDI in not positive as expected, Iyer et al. 
(2004) point to the measurement of spillovers as suspect. They argue that in developed 
countries, spillovers depend on technology gaps and observe that ―small gaps encourage 
spillovers while large gaps inhibit them.‖ (2004:9) OFI has a negative impact in the DC 
sample, which makes sense because OFI flows are not a very important source of capital 
in DCs.  Domestic savings and secondary education, as expected and consistent with 
previous results, they are also important for development in DCs. The size of the working 
population is negatively related to growth, similar to the panel data evidence presented 
earlier and points to the possibility of growth in presence of unemployment or inequitable 
distribution of growth. Political performance in the DC sample is positively related to 
growth. This shows that highly capable governments have the ability to absorb foreign 
capital as well as channel domestic resources for development.  
In emerging markets, FDI and FPI foster growth, similar to the earlier findings. 
Furthermore, domestic savings and current account balance are positively related to 
growth, which shows the importance of domestic resources in utilizing foreign capital.  
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Table 11: Results from Five Year Averaged Data 
 Growth[1] Growth[2] Growth[4] Life Expect.[4] 
 DC EFM LDC LDC 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00001 -0.00072 -0.00017 - 
 (0.86) (8.89)*** (5.09)***  
LifeExpectancy 0.03656 0.14083 0.04735 - 
 (1.30) (4.44)*** (4.78)***  
FDI_GDP -4.22075 93.70192 20.56353 -3.93824 
 (3.28)*** (8.87)*** (9.50)*** (0.65) 
FPI_GDP 8.17361 -123.07233 181.85793 738.22782 
 (3.92)*** (3.68)*** (4.12)*** (5.94)*** 
OFI_GDP -3.76516 8.43448 5.82704 10.94927 
 (2.44)** (1.90)* (7.06)*** (4.77)*** 
Remit_GDP - -28.94751 6.73470 66.15457 
  (5.89)*** (4.16)*** (16.05)*** 
CAofgdp -0.10994 0.17080 0.03559 0.17038 
 (4.05)*** (3.36)*** (3.70)*** (6.61)*** 
Save_GDP 21.76044 7.74718 2.39701 -9.97904 
 (13.73)*** (3.15)*** (3.26)*** (4.87)*** 
RPE 2.61424 -1.99031 -0.99978 -0.46799 
 (12.75)*** (4.27)*** (6.50)*** (1.09) 
second 0.00209 -0.00502 -0.00010 0.02181 
 (6.65)*** (6.25)*** (0.35) (40.04)*** 
work -1.46245 -5.80090 -0.40497 -0.60666 
 (2.48)** (3.50)*** (1.12) (0.59) 
_cons -5.74442 2.07215 -0.87695 50.74180 
 (2.90)*** (0.95) (1.56) (63.87)*** 
R
2
 0.62 0.66 0.16 0.59 
N 440 297 1,493 1,509 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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In EFM sample, politics does not matter; this result may be a neutralization of RPE by 
corruption which is an ongoing still issue in many EFM. Finally, working population is 
negatively associated with growth, pointing to the inequitable distribution of benefits 
from financial globalization. 
In the two LDC models, it is evident that growth and development are not the 
same. While FDI leads to growth, it does not affect human development. Savings boosts 
growth; nonetheless, it negatively affects development. This can be interpreted as 
domestic savings leaving the country and the benefits of growth being concentrated 
among a few. In both models the current account balance is positively related to growth 
as well as development; it is clear from this finding that influx of foreign capital is not the 
development solution to the woes of LDCs. Furthermore, external capital such as aid 
prevents inefficient governments in LDCs to enlist the cooperation of the population. A 
better strategy for LDCs to boost growth and reach higher levels of development is to 
bootstrap their development on domestic resources. Furthermore, improving political 
performance through extraction may be a first step, but it is not enough. The next step for 
LDCs should be to ensure that resources extracted from the population are not wasted or 
fall prey to corruption but rather are allocated efficiently. 
 
Summary 
 The evidence reported above from the three country samples of DCs, EFMs and 
LDCs showed that external finance is not always the key to development. While, external 
finance can play an important role in the economic growth in DCs, which have the 
financial and political infrastructure in place to absorb foreign capital, the reverse is true 
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for structurally and economically weak states. This relationship was demonstrated by the 
positive link between current account balance and development in EFM and LDC 
samples and a negative link between current account balance and development in DCs. 
Furthermore, the analysis also showed that the type of investment matters. While FDI has 
been an important source of development finance in EFMs, portfolio investments have 
been volatile and have the ability to make these countries vulnerable to macroeconomic 
instability. At the same time, in LDCs, FDI has been very volatile and has been primarily 
focused on extractive industries. Therefore, growth associated with FDI in LDCs has not 
translated to improvements in human development. 
 Remittances seem to demonstrate a positive impact on growth as well as 
development in LDCs. However, a problem with remittances is that they are driven by 
migration, and in most cases especially in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the benefit of 
Remittances has been neutralized with the brain drain or loss of a large percentage of 
educated workforce in LDCs (UNCTAD 2007). Therefore while remittances can be 
harnessed for development, the best development policies should focus on improving 
political performance and creating better opportunities at home which would discourage 
migration in the first place. 
 An important finding of this dissertation was that domestic savings play a positive 
and significant role in economic growth in all three country sample. Domestic savings do 
not automatically imply domestic investment, and in fact governments can invest a large 
percentage of savings in foreign assets, as has been observed in many EFMs. Reliance on 
domestic resources further gives weak countries the ability to implement development 
policies that are free from external influence as opposed to ODA, which is usually donor 
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driven. In the case of LDCs however, while savings show a positive impact on growth, 
they have a negative impact on development. An explanation for this finding is the flight 
of capital from the country as well as the lack of profitable investment opportunities at 
home. This has already been observed in Africa, where flight of capital has robbed the 
continent of its much needed domestic resources. According to an UNCTAD (2007) 
report, it is Africa‘s political and economic elites who are primarily engaged in capital 
flight using means such as ―trade misinvoicing, embezzlement of tax revenue, exports 
and aid, and kick back on contracts‖ (UNCTAD 2007: 38). This shows that solution to 
the problem of mismanagement of domestic resources is not only an improvement in 
banking and financial sector and increasing investment opportunities but it is also directly 
related to improvement in political performance. Thus while domestic resources are more 
desirable for countries on the path to development,  demonstrated by the positive 
relationship between current account balance and development, improvement in political 
performance is key for the proper utilization of domestic resources and for discouraging 
capital flight. Improvement in the tax sector can increase government revenue extraction 
and improve governance. However, in a lot of LDCs there is a loss of confidence in the 
governments‘ abilities properly allocate the resources for policy goals that meet 
development objectives. Although this dissertation did not address the impact of 
allocation and political reach components of political performance in improving the 
efficiency of investments, future research should look at these components to provide 
further insight into this relationship.  
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Chapter - 5  
Conclusion and Implications 
 
 
This study aimed to contribute to the existing literature on growth and 
development by considering the question of what kinds of capital flows foster economic 
development in developing countries, given the political performance of each country. 
For this purpose, the study used a variety of methods including cross-section, OLS and 
panel data analysis using a dataset of 120 countries from the years 1980-2007. This 
dataset was further divided into developed countries, emerging markets and less-
developed countries. This study made the case that growth and development do not 
always go hand in hand, especially in the case of fragile states. Hence two models were 
considered for exploring the impact of various forms of capital flows on the economic 
growth and human development. The main finding for this study was that domestic 
resources of finance are superior to foreign capital for developing countries. 
The first question this study addressed was to determine whether or not and to 
what extent foreign capital benefits poor societies, or is it domestic sources of finance 
that are the most important for development. The dissertation first looked at current 
account balance, a composite measure that shows whether countries are net import or net 
exporters of capital. The results from looking at current account balance showed that in 
less-developed countries, current account balance is positively associated with economic 
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growth and development. Furthermore, a positive relationship was observed for the 
interaction between current account and political performance measured by RPE, on 
growth. In the case of developed countries, the results indicated that running current 
account deficits was positively linked to growth; pointing to the ability of these countries 
to absorb and utilize foreign investments. The evidence regarding current account balance 
in emerging markets is mixed, perhaps due to the constantly evolving nature of these 
countries.  
The policy implication of this finding is that poor countries differ in their abilities 
to absorb capital from rich countries. While liberalizing the current account and 
encouraging foreign capital flows may be a sound policy for developed countries, the 
results from this study indicate that it may not be so for developing countries. Instead, 
developing countries, especially low income developing countries may have better 
success in utilizing domestic resources such as domestic savings for improving economic 
growth and creating the conditions under which foreign capital can be beneficial.   
In addition to looking at current account balance, this study also looked separately 
at the impact of domestic savings as well as foreign sources of finance such as FDI, FPI, 
OFI and Remittances on growth and development. The analysis determined that the 
determinants of growth and development are indeed different. In the case of growth, 
domestic savings seem to be the most important factor in growth, and in fact foreign 
capital seems to be of relatively less importance than what a large number of studies 
claim. However, domestic savings seemed to be less important for human development in 
less developed country sample. This result again indicates the flight of capital scenario; in 
absence of strong and efficient governments and fewer profitable opportunities for 
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investment at home, domestic resources are channeled abroad rather than being invested 
at home where they are most needed. Even countries that have experienced respectable 
savings, find their resources fleeing the country. The capital flight from sub-Saharan 
Africa alone from 1970-1996 was reported to be a $285 billion, while the combined debt 
for the region was $178 billion in 1996, making it a net creditor vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world (UNCTAD 2007: 29). This shows that the issue is less of resource constraint and 
more of a lack of political performance, poor tax structures and incapable governments 
and therefore calls for an improvement in RPE. 
In the case of emerging markets, FDI had positive and significant impact on 
growth only when domestic savings were accounted for. This result can be interpreted as 
the confirmation that FDI is useful only when there are enough domestic resources to 
take advantage of positive externalities such as supply chains and backward linkages, as 
is the case of some manufacturing and assembly related FDI. This result can be construed 
as a confirmation of the proposition by Moran (2005) that FDI has positive externalities 
in manufacturing and assembly sectors, under certain conditions and can be detrimental 
in the mining sector.  
FDI also seems to have a positive impact on human development. Thus the 
implication of this finding is that governments should create incentives for FDI in sectors 
where spillovers are the greatest and by employing domestic resources to capture these 
positive externalities. Alternatively, this finding can also be used as a motivation to tax 
extractive FDI. The results also shows that in less-developed countries, savings may even 
be a prerequisite for attracting and efficiently utilizing foreign direct investment, as seen 
by the positive FDI effect due to savings. 
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The study did not find any conclusive impact of FPI and OFI in less-developed 
countries, and in some cases, these capital flows seem to be detrimental to development. 
Furthermore, the impact of aid on human development was negative, showing that 
reliance on foreign aid is not an effective development strategy. 
Remittances seem to have a positive impact on both growth as well as 
development in developing countries. The potential policy implications of this finding 
can be to provide further incentives to attract remittances. It would therefore be 
worthwhile for the government to pursue policies that reduce remittance fees and 
improve transfer technologies such as mobile money transfer which is critical to the 
remittance market (Ratha et al. 2010). However, remittances which are a result of 
migration are associated with a loss of a large percentage of educated and well-trained 
workforces in less developed countries. The best polices would therefore be those that 
focus on creating opportunities at home. 
An important finding of this research supports the claim that correlates of income 
growth and life-expectancy (as a measure of development) are not the same. This 
research also confirms that not all types of capital flows are equal in their growth and 
developmental impact. While domestic resources are most important for development, 
maximizing the impact of these resources depends on improvement in capability of 
governments. Understanding this issue goes to the core of development, as developing 
countries determine the form and extent of capital flows that are most suitable in their 
particular setting. Moreover, improving government performance is the key to not only 
successful utilization of foreign capital for development but also efficient utilization of 
domestic resources. A limitation of this study however, is that it only uses RPE to 
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indirectly measure political performance. Future research on the subject should 
incorporate the other two dimensions of political performance, viz. RPR and RPA, as 
data on this becomes available. Incorporating the RPR dimension of performance should 
show the extent to which the reach of the governments impacts the utilization of capital, 
both foreign and domestic for development. Improvements in RPR can also provide 
insight into how domestic household savings in the informal sector can be efficiently 
utilized. Similarly, RPA should reflect how effectively the government is allocating 
resources to meet its development objectives. The insights from using RPE as a measure 
of performance in this analysis have shown that not only does the type of investments 
matter, but the capability of the government also matters in effectively utilizing finance to 
meet development objectives. 
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Appendix A– Country Samples  
  
  Table A-1: Country Samples 
DC Countries EFM Countries 
1 Australia  1 Brazil  
2 Austria  2 Chile  
3 Canada  3 China, P.R.: Mainland  
4 Cyprus  4 Egypt  
5 Denmark  5 Hungary  
6 Finland  6 India  
7 France  7 Indonesia  
8 Germany  8 Malaysia  
9 Greece  9 Mexico  
10 Iceland  10 Morocco  
11 Ireland  11 Peru  
12 Israel  12 Philippines  
13 Italy  13 Poland  
14 Japan  14 Russia  
15 Korea, Republic of  15 Singapore  
16 Luxembourg  16 South Africa  
17 Netherland  17 Thailand  
18 New Zealand  18 Turkey  
19 Norway  
  20 Portugal  
  21 Spain  
  22 Sweden  
  23 Switzerland  
  24 United Kingdom  
  25 United States  
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   Table A-1: Country Samples (Continued) 
LDC Countries 
1 Albania  27 Estonia  53 Niger  
2 Angola  28 Ethiopia  54 Nigeria  
3 Argentina  29 Fiji  55 Oman  
4 Bahamas  30 Gabon  56 Pakistan  
5 Bahrain  31 Ghana  57 Panama  
6 Bangladesh  32 Guatemala  58 Papua New Guinea  
7 Barbados  33 Guinea  59 Paraguay  
8 Belize  34 Haiti  60 Romania  
9 Benin  35 Honduras  61 Rwanda  
10 Bolivia  36 Iran  62 Sao Tome & Principe  
11 Botswana  37 Jamaica  63 Saudi Arabia  
12 Bulgaria  38 Jordan  64 Senegal  
13 Burkina Faso  39 Kenya  65 Sierra Leone  
14 Burundi  40 Kuwait  66 Sri Lanka  
15 Cameroon  41 Lesotho  67 Sudan  
16 Cape Verde  42 Libya  68 Suriname  
17 Colombia  43 Madagascar  69 Swaziland  
18 Congo, Republic Of  44 Malawi  70 Tanzania  
19 Costa Rica  45 Mali  71 Togo  
20 Cote D Ivoire  46 Malta  72 Trinidad and Tobago  
21 Croatia  47 Mauritius  73 Tunisia  
22 Djibouti  48 Mozambique  74 Uganda  
23 Dominican Republic  49 Myanmar  75 Venezuela  
24 Ecuador  50 Namibia  76 Yemen, Republic Of  
25 El Salvador  51 Nepal  77 Zambia  
26 Eritrea  52 Nicaragua  
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Appendix B – Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Variables Description Sources 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment WDI, IFS 
FPI Foreign Portfolio Investment WDI, IFS 
ODA Official Development Assistance WDI, IFS 
OFI Other Non-FDI Financial Investments, 
Such As Loans  
WDI,IFS 
Domestic Savings Gross national savings-consumption of 
fixed capital 
WDI 
CA Current Account Balance WDI 
Remittances Total Workers Remittances By Country WDI 
GDP Gross Domestic Product WDI 
Life Expectancy Number of years a newborn infant would 
live 
WDI 
GDP Per Capita GDP Per Capita in constant 2000 US 
dollars 
WDI 
Education Secondary education WDI 
Work Size of working population WDI 
RPE Relative Political Extraction  Arbetman et al. 
(forthcoming) 
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Appendix C – Statistical Tables OLS Results 
 
Table C-1: Pooled OLS Regression: Whole Sample     101 
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Table C-4: Pooled OLS Regression: LDC Sample     104 
Table C-5: Pooled OLS Regression: LDC Sample (Life Expectancy)  105 
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Table C-1: Pooled OLS Regression: Whole Sample 
 Growth 
[1] 
Growth 
[2] 
Growth 
[3] 
Growth 
[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00004 -0.00006 -0.00004 -0.00006 
 (2.52)** (3.67)*** (2.03)** (3.36)*** 
LifeExpectancy 0.07953 0.09478 0.07966 0.09652 
 (6.69)*** (8.09)*** (6.69)*** (8.24)*** 
FDI_GDP 2.25023 2.82986 1.74250 7.54925 
 (2.46)** (3.05)*** (0.28) (1.20) 
FPI_GDP -2.49078 -2.83468 -4.93873 -9.87281 
 (2.93)*** (3.30)*** (0.81) (1.61) 
OFI_GDP 3.22265 3.46474 1.92630 2.98670 
 (4.52)*** (4.90)*** (1.17) (1.81)* 
Remit_GDP 5.53593 5.96020 5.31536 -1.59030 
 (2.04)** (2.31)** (0.68) (0.24) 
CAofgdp -0.04178 0.01260 -0.24543 -0.11134 
 (2.98)*** (1.06) (7.83)*** (4.91)*** 
Save_GDP 8.80891  15.48220  
 (8.90)***  (6.87)***  
RPE -0.45482 -0.31511 0.54126 -0.13825 
 (2.09)** (1.45) (1.62) (0.55) 
work 1.29758 1.51351 1.56155 1.74561 
 (1.98)** (2.31)** (2.40)** (2.68)*** 
FDI_RPE   0.56860 -4.37780 
   (0.10) (0.75) 
FPI_RPE   2.38275 6.92851 
   (0.39) (1.14) 
OFI_RPE   1.51497 0.59949 
   (0.86) (0.35) 
CA_RPE   0.20534 0.13212 
   (7.41)*** (6.44)*** 
Remit_RPE   1.23853 7.81873 
   (0.20) (1.44) 
Save_RPE   -5.39292  
   (3.28)***  
_cons -4.78151 -4.99081 -6.05472 -5.38451 
 (5.69)*** (6.02)*** (7.00)*** (6.44)*** 
R
2
 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.07 
N 2,382 2,453 2,382 2,453 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table C-2: Pooled OLS Regression: DC Sample 
 Growth 
[1] 
Growth 
[2] 
Growth 
[3] 
Growth 
[4] 
gdpcap2000wb 0.00001 -0.00003 0.00001 -0.00004 
 (0.33) (1.90)* (0.44) (1.96)* 
LifeExpectancy -0.02708 -0.08439 -0.03375 -0.08738 
 (0.59) (1.67)* (0.73) (1.71)* 
FDI_GDP 0.61195 0.79617 2.32421 6.39481 
 (1.36) (1.59) (0.35) (0.86) 
FPI_GDP -0.71748 -1.19923 -3.41919 -8.09782 
 (1.22) (1.83)* (0.71) (1.52) 
OFI_GDP 1.02379 2.31468 2.61842 1.65163 
 (1.52) (3.14)*** (0.91) (0.51) 
CAofgdp -0.13912 0.04438 -0.05381 0.06466 
 (5.78)*** (2.13)** (0.83) (1.22) 
Save_GDP 24.55774  28.46706  
 (12.12)***  (5.79)***  
RPE 0.92500 0.19827 1.28281 0.17875 
 (4.00)*** (0.80) (3.21)*** (0.66) 
work -2.00443 0.23921 -2.23002 0.24812 
 (2.11)** (0.23) (2.32)** (0.24) 
second 0.00024 0.00023 0.00031 0.00023 
 (1.39) (1.18) (1.79)* (1.20) 
FDI_RPE   -1.61981 -5.18016 
   (0.26) (0.74) 
FPI_RPE   2.59392 6.74809 
   (0.58) (1.35) 
OFI_RPE   -1.51319 0.87222 
   (0.62) (0.32) 
CA_RPE   -0.07820 -0.01604 
   (1.33) (0.39) 
Save_RPE   -2.88699  
   (0.59)  
_cons 2.17813 8.76786 2.25131 9.01794 
 (0.61) (2.25)** (0.62) (2.30)** 
R
2
 0.23 0.04 0.24 0.05 
N 626 626 626 626 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table C-3: Pooled OLS Regression: EFM Sample 
 Growth 
[1] 
Growth 
[2] 
Growth 
[3] 
Growth 
[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00057 -0.00085 -0.00057 -0.00086 
 (3.58)*** (5.15)*** (3.53)*** (5.25)*** 
LifeExpectancy 0.22168 0.24603 0.19521 0.20938 
 (3.83)*** (4.02)*** (3.26)*** (3.31)*** 
FDI_GDP 18.67494 19.47142 -14.78568 -31.69781 
 (2.53)** (2.50)** (0.80) (1.64) 
FPI_GDP 116.76349 114.59602 229.71925 235.18882 
 (3.13)*** (2.90)*** (2.01)** (1.95)* 
OFI_GDP 12.95192 25.78739 24.47208 44.50333 
 (2.15)** (4.27)*** (1.40) (2.56)** 
Remit_GDP -22.21298 -3.00900 -17.70470 -5.30226 
 (2.33)** (0.31) (1.81)* (0.55) 
CAofgdp -0.06177 0.11568 -0.28887 0.06430 
 (1.09) (2.18)** (1.83)* (0.48) 
Save_GDP 20.91544  33.20915  
 (6.61)***  (4.66)***  
RPE 0.37477 -0.57131 1.04569 -1.74662 
 (0.61) (0.90) (1.01) (2.15)** 
second -0.00115 -0.00033 -0.00216 -0.00144 
 (0.98) (0.26) (1.77)* (1.12) 
work -5.38731 1.94080 -6.18354 0.48306 
 (1.84)* (0.68) (2.10)** (0.17) 
FDI_RPE   59.98403 89.37525 
   (2.05)** (2.96)*** 
FPI_RPE   -143.64631 -157.76834 
   (1.12) (1.16) 
OFI_RPE   -8.30587 -17.67217 
   (0.48) (1.05) 
CA_RPE   0.24968 0.07815 
   (1.55) (0.57) 
Save_RPE   -13.85955  
   (2.07)**  
_cons -10.48261 -12.57322 -8.61913 -7.81642 
 (2.60)*** (2.95)*** (1.96)* (1.68)* 
R
2
 0.28 0.19 0.30 0.22 
N 363 363 363 363 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table C-4: Pooled OLS Regression: LDC Sample 
 Growth 
[1] 
Growth 
[2] 
Growth 
[3] 
Growth 
[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00018 -0.00018 -0.00008 -0.00008 
 (3.06)*** (3.00)*** (1.28) (1.37) 
LifeExpectancy 0.07630 0.06236 0.07172 0.05610 
 (3.80)*** (3.25)*** (3.60)*** (2.95)*** 
FDI_GDP 11.46807 16.60405 17.13399 26.20448 
 (3.06)*** (4.60)*** (1.74)* (2.79)*** 
FPI_GDP 40.16264 30.10456 -176.11730 -171.30986 
 (1.13) (0.85) (1.40) (1.37) 
OFI_GDP 2.91510 2.77122 1.43968 1.23124 
 (3.22)*** (3.14)*** (0.75) (0.64) 
Remit_GDP 7.87525 7.23045 9.86109 9.23173 
 (2.35)** (2.31)** (2.96)*** (2.96)*** 
ODA_GDP 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 (4.87)*** (3.40)*** (5.09)*** (3.88)*** 
CAofgdp 0.00272 0.02881 -0.15156 -0.12000 
 (0.16) (1.94)* (4.96)*** (4.22)*** 
Save_GDP 5.32450  4.89651  
 (4.38)***  (4.06)***  
RPE -0.28662 -0.12027 0.05320 0.27691 
 (1.05) (0.45) (0.17) (0.93) 
work -0.40028 0.40232 -0.08532 0.65088 
 (0.49) (0.52) (0.11) (0.84) 
second 0.00062 0.00091 0.00066 0.00101 
 (1.09) (1.62) (1.18) (1.82)* 
FDI_RPE   -4.78369 -8.29363 
   (0.60) (1.07) 
FPI_RPE   199.84182 188.90102 
   (1.76)* (1.67)* 
OFI_RPE   1.56867 1.51776 
   (0.70) (0.69) 
CA_RPE   0.15421 0.14874 
   (6.16)*** (6.13)*** 
_cons -4.37090 -3.61689 -4.83553 -4.05544 
 (3.74)*** (3.22)*** (4.16)*** (3.64)*** 
R
2
 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.08 
N 1,588 1,659 1,588 1,659 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table C-5: Pooled OLS Regression: LDC Sample (Life Expectancy)  
 Life  
Expectancy 
[1] 
Life  
Expectancy 
[2] 
Life 
 Expectancy 
[3] 
Life 
 Expectancy 
[4] 
FDI_GDP 15.08706 11.38243 53.22538 34.05114 
 (3.13)*** (2.39)** (4.35)*** (2.80)*** 
FPI_GDP 14.23007 15.67960 192.07174 171.47501 
 (0.33) (0.35) (1.54) (1.34) 
OFI_GDP -1.61101 -0.55965 -4.81435 -4.24313 
 (1.36) (0.47) (1.92)* (1.64) 
Remit_GDP 55.13337 53.11706 55.37664 53.10994 
 (13.54)*** (13.49)*** (13.63)*** (13.48)*** 
ODA_GDP -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 (11.41)*** (7.37)*** (11.43)*** (7.44)*** 
CAofgdp 0.02622 0.05623 0.02454 0.04602 
 (1.29) (3.55)*** (0.93) (2.02)** 
Save_GDP 3.02096  2.86408  
 (1.93)*  (1.83)*  
RPE -0.80230 -0.34845 -0.22868 0.01327 
 (2.27)** (0.98) (0.58) (0.03) 
work 1.65881 -1.19759 1.39612 -1.38973 
 (1.56) (1.14) (1.30) (1.32) 
second 0.01921 0.02052 0.01906 0.02039 
 (34.92)*** (37.69)*** (34.58)*** (37.23)*** 
FDI_RPE   -32.55042 -19.21733 
   (3.28)*** (1.90)* 
FPI_RPE   -162.41629 -146.08702 
   (1.45) (1.26) 
OFI_RPE   3.82077 4.59964 
   (1.30) (1.54) 
CA_RPE   0.01016 0.01850 
   (0.43) (0.77) 
_cons 51.22304 51.27926 50.80316 51.03564 
 (67.01)*** (67.69)*** (64.77)*** (65.50)*** 
R
2
 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.56 
N 1,599 1,679 1,599 1,679 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix D – Statistical Tables Fixed Effects Results 
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Table D-1: Panel Data Analysis using Fixed-Effects: Whole Sample 
 Growth 
[1] 
Growth 
[2] 
Growth 
[3] 
Growth 
[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00008 -0.00010 -0.00009 -0.00010 
 (1.21) (1.45) (1.23) (1.46) 
LifeExpectancy 0.26026 0.26657 0.26855 0.26658 
 (7.11)*** (7.35)*** (7.15)*** (7.25)*** 
FDI_GDP 4.02785 5.08487 5.82062 11.34628 
 (2.31)** (2.91)*** (0.82) (1.63) 
FPI_GDP -1.15881 -0.97694 -2.53381 -6.29965 
 (1.03) (0.87) (0.40) (1.00) 
OFI_GDP 2.69073 2.93455 1.42563 1.65858 
 (3.70)*** (4.09)*** (0.84) (0.99) 
Remit_GDP 10.22038 18.12155 -17.38583 -2.08623 
 (1.85)* (3.71)*** (1.43) (0.21) 
CAofgdp -0.01604 0.02802 -0.13209 -0.07219 
 (0.93) (1.78)* (3.28)*** (2.36)** 
Save_GDP 8.59895  7.94896  
 (7.08)***  (2.66)***  
RPE -0.27464 -0.34889 -0.11399 -0.07914 
 (0.71) (0.92) (0.23) (0.19) 
work 0.00112 -0.75872 0.48513 -0.85110 
 (0.00) (0.33) (0.21) (0.37) 
FDI_RPE   -1.30930 -5.48917 
   (0.21) (0.88) 
FPI_RPE   1.25853 5.17626 
   (0.20) (0.81) 
OFI_RPE   1.57162 1.58620 
   (0.86) (0.88) 
CA_RPE   0.11453 0.10140 
   (3.39)*** (3.93)*** 
Remit_RPE   24.13755 20.47402 
   (2.49)** (2.36)** 
Save_RPE   0.47247  
   (0.21)  
_cons -15.79030 -14.86901 -16.69026 -15.10031 
 (6.18)*** (5.91)*** (6.43)*** (5.99)*** 
R
2
 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.06 
N 2,382 2,453 2,382 2,453 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table D-2: Panel Data Analysis using Fixed-Effects: DC Sample 
 Growth 
[1] 
Growth 
[2] 
Growth 
[3] 
Growth 
[4] 
gdpcap2000wb 0.00001 0.00003 0.00007 0.00006 
 (0.29) (0.59) (1.43) (1.26) 
LifeExpectancy 0.07713 -0.09573 0.01170 -0.15905 
 (0.98) (1.17) (0.15) (1.88)* 
FDI_GDP 2.39125 2.49579 0.56012 2.01590 
 (2.73)*** (2.67)*** (0.08) (0.25) 
FPI_GDP -0.54937 -0.42745 -4.55444 -5.55816 
 (0.80) (0.59) (0.86) (0.97) 
OFI_GDP 1.32179 1.66545 8.09304 8.53305 
 (1.85)* (2.18)** (2.66)*** (2.59)*** 
CAofgdp -0.14094 0.04182 0.00687 0.17770 
 (4.47)*** (1.59) (0.09) (2.70)*** 
Save_GDP 27.96035  41.10812  
 (9.28)***  (6.06)***  
RPE 0.27412 0.51151 1.19327 0.73046 
 (0.63) (1.11) (1.90)* (1.49) 
work -9.50995 -2.10682 -11.20098 -3.03697 
 (3.77)*** (0.82) (4.39)*** (1.15) 
second 0.00054 0.00090 0.00056 0.00098 
 (1.37) (2.17)** (1.45) (2.34)** 
FDI_RPE   1.76386 0.68981 
   (0.26) (0.10) 
FPI_RPE   3.49808 4.62198 
   (0.69) (0.85) 
OFI_RPE   -6.04996 -5.99456 
   (2.35)** (2.15)** 
CA_RPE   -0.12120 -0.11811 
   (1.77)* (2.43)** 
Save_RPE   -10.99056  
   (1.72)*  
_cons -1.27154 8.71237 2.55403 13.12700 
 (0.22) (1.46) (0.44) (2.14)** 
R
2
 0.16 0.03 0.20 0.05 
N 626 626 626 626 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table D-3: Panel Data Analysis using Fixed-Effects: EFM Sample 
 Growth 
[1] 
Growth 
[2] 
Growth 
[3] 
Growth 
[4] 
gdpcap2000wb -0.00058 -0.00042 -0.00061 -0.00034 
 (1.85)* (1.23) (1.60) (0.78) 
LifeExpectancy 0.25221 0.20059 0.22082 0.14427 
 (3.26)*** (3.32)*** (2.48)** (1.66)* 
FDI_GDP 14.97950 14.90142 -15.43208 -31.52467 
 (1.41) (1.14) (0.59) (1.09) 
FPI_GDP 95.10916 100.71017 168.87398 149.30918 
 (3.45)*** (3.38)*** (2.14)** (1.78)* 
OFI_GDP 16.37669 23.37150 31.59750 38.70985 
 (1.50) (2.25)** (1.06) (1.34) 
Remit_GDP -0.04144 21.42806 1.73610 20.71300 
 (0.00) (3.29)*** (0.21) (3.01)*** 
CAofgdp -0.11307 0.00618 -0.24080 -0.17574 
 (0.96) (0.05) (1.13) (0.88) 
Save_GDP 20.32238  19.32976  
 (6.05)***  (4.81)***  
RPE 0.32941 -0.60211 -0.36391 -1.56013 
 (0.24) (0.49) (0.20) (0.88) 
second 0.00003 0.00147 -0.00013 0.00129 
 (0.01) (0.44) (0.03) (0.36) 
work 1.45709 8.61197 1.79724 7.10891 
 (0.35) (2.06)** (0.35) (1.21) 
FDI_RPE   53.03588 79.06992 
   (1.07) (1.49) 
FPI_RPE   -93.85321 -67.79108 
   (0.91) (0.63) 
OFI_RPE   -12.10665 -12.71802 
   (0.60) (0.61) 
CA_RPE   0.14952 0.21066 
   (1.08) (1.65)* 
_cons -17.32751 -15.90319 -14.78497 -10.90925 
 (2.51)** (2.58)*** (1.73)* (1.32) 
N 363 363 363 363 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table D-4: Panel Data Analysis using Fixed-Effects: LDC Sample 
 Growth 
[1] 
Growth 
[2] 
Growth 
[3] 
Growth 
[4] 
gdpcap2000wb 0.00030 0.00025 0.00026 0.00022 
 (1.25) (1.04) (1.08) (0.94) 
LifeExpectancy 0.28017 0.28733 0.26634 0.26734 
 (5.57)*** (5.92)*** (5.21)*** (5.46)*** 
FDI_GDP 5.62386 9.50285 12.68823 20.08505 
 (1.30) (2.28)** (1.15) (1.95)* 
FPI_GDP 17.73707 14.62539 -85.49691 -115.23218 
 (0.45) (0.37) (0.62) (0.84) 
OFI_GDP_ 2.71082 2.77014 0.78562 0.30087 
 (2.92)*** (3.07)*** (0.38) (0.15) 
Remit_GDP 6.94613 12.47032 -15.02669 -3.66185 
 (1.00) (2.07)** (1.00) (0.31) 
ODA_GDP 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 (2.33)** (1.51) (2.23)** (1.72)* 
CAofgdp 0.00143 0.03734 -0.10185 -0.08004 
 (0.07) (1.92)* (2.05)** (2.17)** 
Save_GDP 6.48103  2.08314  
 (4.45)***  (0.57)  
RPE -0.39849 -0.37307 -0.23141 0.21246 
 (0.78) (0.76) (0.35) (0.39) 
work -0.38828 -1.74544 -0.16579 -2.21994 
 (0.13) (0.59) (0.05) (0.74) 
second 0.00002 -0.00027 0.00056 0.00018 
 (0.01) (0.20) (0.40) (0.13) 
FDI_RPE   -5.14147 -9.01478 
   (0.58) (1.07) 
FPI_RPE   97.35552 126.33347 
   (0.79) (1.03) 
OFI_RPE   2.39882 2.97437 
   (0.99) (1.26) 
CA_RPE   0.10228 0.11651 
   (2.50)** (3.82)*** 
Remit_RPE   20.24800 17.56403 
   (1.70)* (1.68)* 
Save_RPE   3.35740  
   (1.25)  
_cons -17.32875 -16.06104 -16.89536 -15.44593 
 (5.44)*** (5.23)*** (5.24)*** (5.03)*** 
R
2
 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 
N 1,588 1,659 1,588 1,659 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
111 
Table D-5: Panel Data Analysis using Fixed-Effects: LDC Sample (Life Expectancy) 
 Life  
Expectancy 
[1] 
Life 
 Expectancy 
[2] 
Life 
 Expectancy 
[3] 
Life 
Expectancy 
[4] 
FDI_GDP 7.35565 9.34966 22.54765 22.38832 
 (3.43)*** (4.52)*** (4.25)*** (4.44)*** 
FPI_GDP 7.61173 4.99629 21.05879 15.97855 
 (0.40) (0.26) (0.40) (0.30) 
OFI_GDP -1.23919 -1.06985 -0.48612 -0.58769 
 (2.63)*** (2.31)** (0.47) (0.57) 
Remit_GDP 48.06111 40.63745 47.07692 40.14494 
 (14.43)*** (13.98)*** (14.07)*** (13.80)*** 
ODA_GDP 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 
 (0.66) (0.41) (0.52) (0.59) 
CAofgdp -0.02690 -0.01539 -0.01988 -0.03026 
 (2.94)*** (2.18)** (0.98) (3.37)*** 
Save_GDP 1.45601  -0.77965  
 (2.04)**  (0.43)  
RPE 0.22741 0.19467 0.32785 0.55867 
 (0.87) (0.77) (1.02) (2.08)** 
work 3.36477 4.81520 3.50706 4.71873 
 (2.17)** (3.15)*** (2.25)** (3.07)*** 
second 0.00939 0.00871 0.00942 0.00865 
 (14.35)*** (13.23)*** (14.41)*** (13.20)*** 
FDI_RPE   -12.34757 -10.81200 
   (2.89)*** (2.61)*** 
FPI_RPE   -6.75875 -5.20618 
   (0.14) (0.11) 
OFI_RPE   -1.02917 -0.68470 
   (0.83) (0.57) 
CA_RPE   0.00586 0.02547 
   (0.32) (2.42)** 
Save_RPE   2.09883  
   (1.57)  
_cons 52.84095 52.55796 52.70583 52.31658 
 (59.14)*** (59.73)*** (58.28)*** (59.29)*** 
R
2
 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.24 
N 1,599 1,679 1,599 1,679 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix E – Statistical Tables Cross Section Results 
 
Table E-1: Cross Section Regression: 1980-1990     113 
Table E-2: Cross Section Regression: 1990-2000     114 
Table E-3: Cross Section Regression: 2000-2007     115 
 
 
  
113 
Table E-1: Cross Section Regression: 1980-1990 
 Gy80_90 
[1] 
[Gy80_90 
[2] 
Gy80_90 
[3] 
Gy80_90 
[4] 
GDP_1980cap2000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
 (2.26)** (2.48)** (1.69) (1.80)* 
Life expectancy 0.01435 0.01335 0.01320 0.01436 
 (5.15)*** (5.03)*** (4.19)*** (5.23)*** 
FDI_GDP_1980 2.35015 2.56957 2.23530 4.68722 
 (2.63)** (3.12)*** (0.61) (1.54) 
FPI_GDP_1980 -10.71693 -11.30804 0.15013 -0.04877 
 (1.31) (1.40) (0.01) (0.00) 
Remit_GDP_1980 0.62705 0.48400 -2.32844 -2.78880 
 (1.00) (0.78) (1.07) (1.42) 
OFI_GDP_1980 0.40637 0.26074 -0.11816 -0.50187 
 (0.78) (0.52) (0.07) (0.36) 
CAofGDP_1980 0.00587 0.00457 -0.00569 0.00232 
 (1.53) (1.67) (0.53) (0.44) 
RPE_1980 -0.09696 -0.10107 0.01747 -0.11542 
 (2.44)** (2.53)** (0.13) (1.29) 
Save_GDP_1980 0.08737  1.12880  
 (0.36)  (1.29)  
laborforcetotal_1980 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.34) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) 
FDI_RPE_1980   -0.82091 -2.83073 
   (0.21) (0.86) 
FPI_RPE_1980   -16.86396 -16.08907 
   (0.67) (0.70) 
CA_RPE_1980   0.01002 0.00282 
   (1.18) (0.71) 
Remit_RPE_1980   1.95145 2.44865 
   (1.29) (1.80)* 
OFI_RPE_1980   0.26103 0.57367 
   (0.22) (0.54) 
Save_RPE_1980   -0.80104  
   (1.30)  
Constant -0.28946 -0.20768 -0.31311 -0.22086 
 (1.74)* (1.31) (1.62) (1.26) 
F statistic 13.4 14.4 8.3 9.7 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table E-2: Cross Section Regression: 1990-2000 
 Gy90_00 
[1] 
Gy90_00 
[2] 
Gy90_00 
[3] 
Gy90_00 
[4] 
GDP_1990cap2000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
 (4.20)*** (3.51)*** (3.90)*** (3.25)*** 
Life expectancy 0.01066 0.01134 0.00980 0.01125 
 (7.28)*** (7.58)*** (5.72)*** (6.60)*** 
FDI_GDP_1990 0.21996 0.14053 -1.03301 0.62684 
 (0.27) (0.17) (0.35) (0.26) 
FPI_GDP_1990 7.64754 6.88500 11.15905 7.63396 
 (1.99)* (1.72)* (0.77) (0.50) 
Remit_GDP_1990 -0.39040 -0.52845 0.67763 0.13796 
 (1.09) (1.42) (0.50) (0.10) 
OFI_GDP_1990 -0.02765 -0.02257 -0.02880 -0.03230 
 (0.82) (0.64) (0.39) (0.46) 
CAofGDP_1990 0.00125 0.00315 0.00300 0.00431 
 (0.74) (2.04)** (0.92) (1.27) 
RPE_1990 -0.06238 -0.03490 -0.00753 -0.01412 
 (2.44)** (1.65) (0.15) (0.29) 
Save_GDP_1990 0.21936  0.58535  
 (1.71)*  (2.28)**  
laborforcetotal_1990 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 (0.66) (0.53) (0.95) (0.51) 
FDI_RPE_1990   1.10375 -0.52728 
   (0.40) (0.24) 
FPI_RPE_1990   -3.13648 -0.64130 
   (0.20) (0.04) 
CA_RPE_1990   -0.00018 -0.00059 
   (0.07) (0.23) 
Remit_RPE_1990   -1.07356 -0.60621 
   (0.97) (0.53) 
OFI_RPE_1990   -0.00478 -0.02769 
   (0.03) (0.16) 
Save_RPE_1990   -0.24181  
   (1.47)  
Constant -0.09422 -0.12591 -0.09138 -0.13705 
 (1.03) (1.35) (0.90) (1.32) 
F statistic 32.2 32.8 19.3 19.3 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.81 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table E-3: Cross Section Regression: 2000-2007 
 Gy00_07 
[1] 
Gy00_07 
[2] 
Gy00_07 
[3] 
Gy00_07 
[3] 
GDP_2000cap2000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
 (2.58)** (2.20)** (2.44)** (2.18)** 
Life expectancy 0.01144 0.01206 0.01140 0.01183 
 (5.45)*** (5.73)*** (4.96)*** (5.24)*** 
FDI_GDP_2000 0.84097 0.78821 1.75704 1.50521 
 (1.24) (1.15) (0.74) (0.64) 
FPI_GDP_2000 -0.12891 -0.06712 0.70154 2.08090 
 (0.44) (0.23) (0.10) (0.29) 
Remit_GDP_2000 -0.88110 -0.80870 -1.28944 -1.13963 
 (1.71)* (1.55) (0.60) (0.54) 
OFI_GDP_2000 -0.04060 0.00865 0.53852 0.61898 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.59) (0.67) 
CAofGDP_2000 0.00064 0.00501 0.00213 0.00362 
 (0.20) (2.42)** (0.21) (0.66) 
RPE_2000 0.08373 0.07070 0.07316 0.09832 
 (1.50) (1.25) (0.47) (1.10) 
Save_GDP_2000 0.56462  0.22321  
 (1.95)*  (0.21)  
laborforcetotal_2000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.44) (0.63) (0.45) (0.56) 
FDI_RPE_2000   -0.74301 -0.41593 
   (0.30) (0.17) 
FPI_RPE_2000   -0.70260 -1.88158 
   (0.11) (0.30) 
CA_RPE_2000   -0.00013 0.00300 
   (0.01) (0.45) 
Remit_RPE_2000   0.40146 0.31458 
   (0.21) (0.17) 
OFI_RPE_2000   -0.67239 -0.76529 
   (0.62) (0.71) 
Save_RPE_2000   0.36021  
   (0.31)  
Constant -0.11763 -0.07735 -0.10230 -0.08817 
 (0.92) (0.60) (0.59) (0.62) 
F statistic 17.5 18.4 9.8 11.0 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.72 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix F- Correlation Matrix 
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